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Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago
View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions*
JOHN COLLINS COFFEE, JR.**

In this article, Professor Coffee argues that fines are an inefficient
means by which to deter organizationalcrimes. Instead, he urges a
focus on the individual decision-maker and a system of competitive
bids with respect to the choice of a fine as an alternativepunishment.
Among economists, the tide of academic imperialism has reached full
flood. No longer content to focus the tools of their profession on the
traditional problems of economics, over the last dozen years they have begun
to analyze aspects of human behavior not characterized by market transactions. In so doing, economists have applied their central premise that
individuals engage in utility-maximizing behavior to such diverse fields as
family planning, political participation, altruism, and crime.'
Predictably, the reaction of the academic legal community to these
colonizing ambitions has been mixed and perhaps even defensive. Few would
deny that the contributions made by the economists have been serious,
provocative, and original. 2 But it disquiets many to watch the easy facility
* © John Collins Coffee, Jr. All rights reserved. Permission to reprint this article must be obtained
from the author.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1966, Amherst College; LL.B. 1969,
Yale Law School. Since the author has served as Reporter for the second edition of the ABA Standards on
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates in August 1979), a
caveat is in order: the views expressed herein neither purport to represent those of the ABA nor are
necessarily consistent with positions taken in the Standards. In light of the views herein expressed, the
author suspects this will be self-evident.
The author also wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments and criticism received in the preparation
of this article from the following present or former colleagues: Thomas Bergin, Charles Goetz, Richard
Lempert, Harvey Perlman, Warren Schwartz, and Louis M. Seidman. None of the foregoing is guilty (to
the author's knowledge) of agreement with the views expressed herein.
i. Among the best-known examples of the economic analysis of human behavior are: G. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH To HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS (R. Selden ed. 1975); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); M. OLSON,

THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
Within the field of criminal law, the following works deserve special mention: Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 164 (1968); K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE
ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976); Erlich, The Deterrent Effect of
Criminal Law Enforcement, I J. LEGAL STUD. 254 (1972); Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
2. However, other economists have disputed both the economic assumptions underlying this attempt to
extend neoclassical economics to non-market transactions and the specific conclusions reached if such an
approach is taken. For a provocative critique, see Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective
Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Low, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1976). Even
assuming that the potential offender is a utility maximizer and makes a criminal choice after balancing the
costs and benefits, some economists still disagree with the policy conclusions reached by Becker and
Posner. See, e.g., Block & Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment. 4 J. LEGAL
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with which the economist moves across fields of knowledge to apply his
approach and reach policy conclusions that tend to be strikingly inconsistent
with those long held within the field. Such omniscience raises doubts. One has
a sense approaching that of watching Howard Cosell broadcast on successive
nights a boxing match, Monday Night Football, and the World Series: as the
speaker moves farther and farther from his field of expertise, thin spots in his
knowledge appear, overgeneralizations multiply, and, progressively, the
descriptions seem less and less to match the events actually occurring in the
arena.
These skeptical comments do not deny that the field of criminal law
scholarship has long stood in need of the kind of rigorous cost-benefit
examination that the economist can offer. Indeed, this article will attempt to
develop an essentially economic analysis of criminal sanctions. But, if the
lawyer tends to accept uncritically the traditional assumptions of criminal
law, there is a countervailing bias in the economist's approach. Recurrently,
there seems to be an unwillingness to acknowledge that the economic
approach is essentially an analytic language-hereinafter
called
"EcoSpeak"-rather than any set of deductively derived policy conclusions.
Yet, despite the seeming precision with which this language speaks, those
fluent in EcoSpeak have sometimes disagreed diametrically in applying its
reasoning to the criminal law. 3 In truth, this should be reassuring, rather than
surprising, for it is exactly this latitude within the economic approach that
distinguishes it from a cult. In the social sciences, rigid models tend to be
short-lived, but perspectives endure. Thus, to argue, as this article will, that
no single model can legitimately claim to be the economic theory of criminal
sanctions is not to condemn the economic approach, but rather to suggest that
EcoSpeak has an enduring relevance which transcends the uses to which it
has been put by its truest believers.
Modem efforts to develop an economic theory for the optimal use of
criminal sanctions essentially began with the work of University of Chicago
Professor Gary Becker. In essence, Becker has propounded a "cost minimization" model that recognizes three general types of costs associated with crime:
(1) the social costs that result from the illegal conduct; (2) the punishment
STUD. 241 (1979). See also R. BLAIR, ANTITRUST PENALTIES, DETERRENCE AND COMPENSATION (1978)

(monograph, Center for the Study of American Business). This article is in general agreement with much of
the analysis offered by Block & Lind and Blair. Its approach differs, however, by seeking to rest its analysis
on a model for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty developed by von Neuman and
Morgenstern and now commonly used within the business community. See W.J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC
THEORY AND OPERATION ANALYSIS ch. 24 (2d ed. 1965).

3. A good example is the current dispute among economists as to whether organized crime produces
more or less social harm than would exist in an environment of pure competition among criminals. One
side in this debate argues that because monopolization tends to reduce the output in the market which has
been monopolized, it is socially desirable that criminal activity be organized by a syndicate that has the
equivalent of monopoly power. See Buchanan, A Defense of Organized Crime in S. ROTrENBERG,
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1973); R. POSNER supra note I, at 175-76. The other side
argues that economies of scale will result in the organized criminal syndicate producing a disproportionately greater criminal output. See Backhaus, Defending Organized Crime: A Note, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1979). In essence, this debate only translates into the criminal law context a long-standing controversy
among antitrust scholars as to whether economies of scale can offset the monopoly's tendency to reduce
output. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense, 58 AM. EON. REV. 18 (1968); cf. K. ELZINGA
& W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 99-111. Intellectually stimulating as this debate may be, it seems unresolvable
without detailed empirical research.
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costs that result from the imposition of a sanction upon the offender; and (3)
the transaction costs to the judicial system that are associated with apprehending and punishing offenders. 4 Whether these are the only costs which
should be considered will be examined later, but from this definition of the
relevant costs the Becker model can proceed to its basic assertion: an optimal
system of criminal justice reduces the aggregate of these costs to a minimum.
Inherently, such a model requires trade-offs, because reducing one type of
cost (e.g., the cost to the victim) will not reduce the aggregate cost if in so
doing another cost component is increased by a more than corresponding
margin.
From such a perspective focused on getting the "biggest bang for the
buck," a number of trade-offs become evident: some forms of criminal
sanctions may be more expensive than others; it may be more costly to
achieve a high apprehension rate than to punish severely those few who are
apprehended; the harmful effects of some crimes may be less than the
enforcement costs necessary to deter them. The temptation arises to draw
some fairly obvious policy conclusions from the Becker model and proclaim
them the fruit of economic reasoning. Indeed, although Professor Becker has
surrounded his own conclusions with a number of careful qualifications, his
disciples have begun to treat his model as a set of policy prescriptions which
are ready for implementation. As so modified, this theory for the optimal use
of criminal sanctions-which this article will call the Free Market
Model-has three basic tenets, each of which contradicts the conventional
wisdom which both criminal lawyers and criminologists have long shared:
1. The Preferred Form of Sanction: Fines are seen as the optimal form of
criminal sanction, superior to incarceration, because imprisonment wastes
both society's resources and the offender's productive capacity. 5 Thus,
confinement is a sanction of last resort to be used only when the offender
either will not or cannot pay an adequate fine.
2. The Appropriate Cost-Bearer: When crimes are committed on behalf of
an organization, the organization, rather than the individual who actually
engages in the criminal act, should pay the fine. 6 (The assumption here is that
the organization will discipline its agent if it is in its interest to do so.) In
addition, some economists also argue that this fine should be the exclusive
penalty, precluding even the award of civil damages, because the potential
availability of damages creates a "perverse incentive" leading claimants to
misrepresent their injuries and to extort settlements. 7
3. The Certainty-Severity Trade-Off. In general, high penalties are favored
over more vigorous law enforcement. That is, it is asserted to be more cost
efficient to raise the severity of the sanction than the probability of conviction,
because society can incarcerate more cheaply than it can apprehend additional offenders. 8
4. G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 77 (defining the social loss from offenses to be "the sum of damages, costs
of apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out the punishments imposed . . .").
5. See G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 63-68; R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 167-72; cf. K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, supra note 1, at 112-38.
6. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 132-38; R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 235-36; see R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225-26 (1976) [hereinafter R. POSNER, ANTITRUST].
7. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note i, at 113-17. For their discussion of the "perverse incentives"
and "misinformation" created when one rewards the private enforcer, see id. at 84-96.
8. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 167-7 1. Essentially Posner argues that the costs of raising the likelihood
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It is an understatement to call such a model counter-intuitive. More
accurately, it is a profound attack on traditional criminal law scholarship, one
that almost seems to gain a perverse delight in reversing assumptions that
have stood since the times of Bentham and Beccaria. 9 No doubt, the practical
lawyer is inclined to respond to such contentions in the manner of Dickens'
Mr. Bumble, 10 but the consistent response of the Chicago school to its critics
has been that the test of a model is its ability to predict, not the plausibility of
its premises.
Cogent as this claim may seem, the present state of empirical knowledge
does not permit either side to claim more than fragmentary evidence in its
favor."' Thus, in the absence of unambiguous data (a situation likely to
persist), it is necessary to focus on the internal logic of the Free Market
Model. This article will do so partly as a primer, because criminal justice
policy planning cannot continue to ignore the possible relevance of economic
analysis. The larger objective of this inquiry, however, will be to demonstrate
that the Free Market Model is not the economic theory of criminal sanctions,
but only an economic theory. Moreover, it is an economic theory which seems
flawed once we introduce both traditional elements of economic analysis
(such as uncertainty) and non-economic factors that are deeply embedded in
the structure of our criminal justice system (such as the tendency toward
nullification of extreme penalties). These factors, however, can be introduced
into a rational-actor model for the "criminal choice" decision. Once this is
done, the method of economic analysis seems to lead to policy conclusions
quite different from those of the Free Market Model.
Dramatic differences emerge from only modest differences in premises.
From a starting point only marginally different from that of the Free Market
Model, this article will assert that economic analysis tends to support the
following propositions: (1) the threat of incarceration typically will have a
greater deterrent value than the threat of a fine; (2) more deterrence is
generated by penalties focused on an individual than on an organization; and,
of conviction far exceed those of increasing the severity of the sanction (Le., more police and prosecutors
cost more than doubling the length of the prison term). This argument is analyzed in the text
accompanying notes 157-76 infra.
9. Bentham argued that fines should be proportional to the wealth of the offender. See J. BENTHAM,
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 217 (Baxi ed. R. Hildreth trans. 1975). In contrast, Becker argues that the fine

should depend upon the harm done by the offender, and not upon his economic position. G. BECKER, supra
note 1, at 65.
Cesare Beccaria, of course, was the original proponent of the view that it is the certainty of punishment
rather than its severity which is of chief importance in deterring crime. See M. MAESTRO, CESARE
BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM (1973).
10. As readers of Oliver Twist will recall, Mr. Bumble is informed that in the eyes of the law he is
considered responsible for his wife's acts. Dickens then writes:
"If the law supposes that," said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands,
"the law is a ass-a idiot. If that's the eye of the law, the law's a bachelor; and the worst I wish
the law is that his eye may be opened by experience-by experience."
C.

DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES

OF OLIVER TWIST.

11. For the most thorough summaries of the current empirical evidence, see PANEL ON RESEARCH ON
DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS,

DETERRENCE

AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE

EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (National Academy of Sciences 1978). This study

finds that "the evidence on the association between sentence severity . . . and crime rates is . . .
equivocal." Id. at 110.
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(3) the certainty of a sanction is, within the context discussed, more important
than its severity.
Professor Posner, in his contribution to this Symposium, summarizes this
article's arguments in a manner that I believe misrepresents them.' 2 To
unmuddy the waters thus clouded, several prefatory comments are in order.
First, this article does not assert that monetary equivalents to incarceration
cannot exist. Within the sentencing ranges authorized for organizational
crime,' 3 it is likely that monetary sanctions exist that are even more severe
than the typically symbolic sentences of imprisonment which are imposed for
such crimes. Actual severity, however, is not synonymous with the notion of a
legal threat. This article will suggest that the notion of a legal threat must be
developed (at least in the case of the rational potential offender) in terms of a
"mean/variance" analysis of the total range of penalties applicable to the
offender. From this premise, it will be deduced that: (1) the legal threat
inherent in any realistic range of incarcerative penalties will generally exceed
that applicable to the range of monetary penalties authorized for the same
crime; and (2) the greater threat associated with incarcerative penalties
cannot be efficiently offset simply by increasing the severity of authorized
monetary penalties.
Second, beyond a simple rebuttal of the Free Market Model, this article
attempts to outline the conditions necessary to maintain a mixed system
having different forms of criminal sanctions without sacrificing the additional
deterrence of incarceration. This essentially involves developing an arbitragelike mechanism to reduce the disparity in the threat potential of fines and
imprisonment. In so doing, it is acknowledged that there are some advantages, such as victim compensation, which fines uniquely offer.
Third, because criminologists are increasingly skeptical of deterrence
theories that are not "crime specific,"' 4 it should be stressed that the model
here offered is advanced only within the context of organizational crime. In
this context, we can largely discount the traditional reply of the skeptic to the
theorist seeking to explain crime: i.e., that crime is a complex, non-rational
phenomenon, too deeply rooted in the individual's psychopathology or in
sociological forces to be explained by rationalistic criteria. As valid as this
generalization may sometimes be, it seems here more an intellectual crutch
12. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 413-14 (1980).
13. The authorized maximum sentences for most white-collar crimes are low and in marked contrast to
high maximums that characterize other crimes. Thus, for example, a violation of the Clayton Act can
result in a sentence of up to one year (15 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)), and a violation of the Sherman Act may now
result in a sentence of up to three years (15 U.S.C. § I (1976)). Prior to 1974, the maximum sentence for a
Sherman Act violation was only one year. Under Section 24 ofthe Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77x)
and Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78f) violations of the federal
securities laws may be punished by up to five years in prison (plus a fine of up to $10,000). In contrast,
maximum sentences in excess of 10 and 20 years characterize the criminal codes of most U.S. jurisdictions.
See commentary to AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter ABA
SENTENCING STANDARDS], STANDARD 18-2.1. Of course, this disparity can be seen as an example of what
the economist terms a "self-insurance" principle: those able to influence legislation keep the penalties low
for conduct they may some day commit. Or, it may reflect a social consensus that these crimes are less
serious. Once again, the answer appears indeterminate.
14. See, e.g., Zimring, Policy Experiments in General Deterrence: 1970-1975 in DETERRENCE AND
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL. SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 140, 172
(Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, 1978).
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than a rebuttal. If ever the rational-actor model employed by the economist
has predictive power with regard to criminal behavior, it is in the context of
organizational crime that its explanatory capacity is greatest. Within this
context, the typical offenses (price fixing, tax fraud, securities, and other
regulatory violations) scarcely amount to "crimes of passion," carry relatively
little stigma, and are committed by individuals who neither come from
deprived backgounds nor act out of uncontrollable impulses. 15 Far more
comprehensible and easily deterred motivations-personal gain and organizational loyalty-appear to supply adequate causal explanations.
The term "organizational crime" is here used in preference to the more
widely known phrase of "white-collar crime" because the latter term includes
both the individual who commits a crime against an organization (e.g., an
embezzler) as well as the individual who commits a crime for an organization
(e.g., the price fixer). Important distinctions exist between these two types. It
is the second type, the "organizational criminal," who will be the principal
object of our study, because his crimes seem more likely to be planned6
collectively and with fuller consideration of the respective costs and benefits.'

I.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CRIMINAL AND BR'ER RABBIT'S BRIAR PATCH:
UNCLE REMUS LOOKS AT THE CHOICE OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

Debates about the relative merits of fines versus incarceration as criminal
sanctions usually involve one side focusing on relative costs and the other on
relative benefits. Those favoring greater reliance on fines make the following
arguments: (1) fines are cheaper to society, because they do not involve the
costs of a prison system; (2) fines can be used to compensate the victim, either
through direct restitution or by funding a more generalized victim compensation system, thereby reducing the costs to the victim and easing the burden on
civil courts; and (3) fines, which are in essence only transfer payments, do not
involve the "dead weight" loss on society that occurs when a productive
individual is incarcerated. Although the concept of reduced social productivity may be taken much more seriously by economists than by the legal
community, some cases can certainly be posited in which it merits attention
(for example, when the sole doctor in a rural town is convicted of medicaid
fraud).
15. This is not to say, however, that even white-collar crimes are always the rational product of a
cost/benefit calculus. One such deviant case was the recent "Begelman affair" in Hollywood in which a
high Hollywood executive blatantly diverted funds from employees in a manner that strongly suggested a
subconscious desire to be caught. See generally, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1977, at 53, col. 1. Similarly, in the
Equity Funding case, the forging of bogus insurance policies must have been committed with the
knowledge of at least some within the organization that the fraud would eventually come to tight. See
generally, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1975, at 75, col. 7.
16. For excellent surveys of the traditional non-economic literature on organizational crime (which
makes this point recurrently), see Davids, Penology and Corporate Crime, 58 J. CaIM. L.C. & P.S. 524
(1967); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Regulations, 30 U. CHi.
L. REV. 23 (1963); McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability. An Eclectic
Alternative, 46 U. CINN. L. REv. 989 (1978); Whiting, Antitrust and the CorporateExecutive (pts. 1, 2), 47
VA. L. REV. 929,48 VA. L. REV. 1(1961-62); Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate
Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976); Note, IncreasingCommunity Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem
In the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280 (1961); Developments in the Law-CorporateCrime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (1979).
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The proponents of incarceration can be equally succinct: (1) fines will be
"passed on" to the organization, either through indemnification payments or
covert increases in salary or fringe benefits, thereby undercutting the
deterrent effect of the penalty; (2) although fines may provide deterrence, they
do not incapacitate the dangerous offender-a point which may seem
irrelevant in this area of non-violent crime, but which still may deserve some
weight once the statistics on "corporate recidivism" are examined; (3) even if
a monetary equivalent to imprisonment exists, courts could never accurately
determine the trade-offs and would waste considerable time and resources in
the attempt; and (4) reliance on fines is so demonstrably discriminatory
against the poor that, even if constitutional, it would exacerbate social
antagonisms along predictable class and racial lines.
Overshadowing these arguments, however, is a more fundamental issue:
are fines and imprisonment equivalent deterrents? On this issue, a legion of
legal commentators have confidently asserted that only the threat of imprisonment can truly deter the businessman. 17 If such assertions could be cited as
evidence, the case against fines would be strong indeed. In general, however,
little is cited in support of this contention beyond anecdotal experiences and
personal beliefs.
Equally dogmatic, the classical economist asserts that for any period of
imprisonment there is a monetary equivalent.18 To the majority of
noneconomists, this "insight" sounds suspiciously like an ipse dixit. But here,
the economist is simply carrying the idea of the indifference curve to its
logical extreme. An indifference curve does nothing more than plot a series of
trade-offs between two goods or outcomes between which the individual has
no preference. 19 Thus, an individual can be extremely averse to imprisonment
and even highly sensitive to small increases in the length of a sentence; yet a
monetary equivalent could exist.
As Diagram A illustrates, only an extraordinarily severe fine could make a
wealthy offender prefer confinement, and only enormous decreases in the size
of the fine could tempt him to accept small increases in the length of
confinement. 20 Nonetheless, the hypothetical individual whose trade-offs are
represented by this curve can be said to be "indifferent" among the following
outcomes, which are each plotted as a point on the curve: (a) a two million
dollar fine and no imprisonment, (b) a one-year sentence and no fine, (c) a
$500,000 fine and a six-month sentence, and (d) a one million dollar fine and a
three-month sentence. Such an analysis does not deny that there may be
periods of imprisonment for which monetary equivalents do not exist, 2' but
17. For a collection of such statements from legislators, lawyers, and prosecutors, see K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, supra note 1, at 39-42. See also, Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: A Critique, 86 YALE L.J. 630
(1977).
18. K. ELZINGA &W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 123; G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 66-67 (noting, however,
that fines may not be used when the harm exceeds the resources of the offender).
19. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 441-42 (9th ed. 1973).
20. In Diagram A, our hypothetical millionaire offender would be indifferent if instead of a $2,000,000
fine, the monetary penalty were reduced by $1,000,000 and a three month sentence were imposed. Put
differently, he would be willing to pay up to $999,999 to obtain a rescission of the three month sentence. It
should not be assumed, however, that the one year sentence plotted on Diagram A is the maximum limit on
monetary equivalents for our hypothetical offender. Individuals have multiple indifference curves; where,
as here, the comparison is between disutilities, the offender would always prefer the interior curve to any
exterior one. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 120-25.
21. Of course, the offender's own wealth places a limit on the existence of monetary equivalents. See
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DIAGRAM A

A HYPOTHETICAL FINE/IMPRISONMENT

INDIFFERENCE CURVE
$2,000,000

Z

$ 1,000,000

3 Months

6 Months

One Year

IMPRISONMENT

posits that within some ranges trade-offs are possible. At present, both the
authorized and actual sentences of imprisonment applicable to organizational
crime are extremely low. Given, for example, that the longest prison sentence
actually served by a "white-collar" offender convicted of price-fixing has
never exceeded one year, 22 it must be conceded that there is an equally severe
monetary penalty for such a sentence, even if one still doubts that there would
be a monetary equivalent for, gay, a ten-year sentence. Consider, for example,
a typical senior executive of a large corporation who is nearing retirement and
over a forty-year career has accumulated a substantial estate. If the choice
were between a three-month period of confinement and a $500,000 fine, he
could well choose the former, because the accumulation of a sizable personal
Block & Lind, supra note 2, at 242-43 (1975). In addition, Block and Lind discuss other necessary limits,
but for our purposes it will be taken as intuitively obvious that most individuals would recognize no
monetary equivalent to a sentence of life imprisonment.
22. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST supra note 6, at 33. Professor Posner has compiled a chart showing
prison sentences imposed in federal antitrust cases from 1890 to 1974; the longest sentence imposed since
1960 appears to have been nine months and only 14 prison sentences were imposed between 1940 and 1974.
Elzinga and Breit go one step further and attempt to compute the time actually served. They find most
defendants had even these short sentences suspended. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note I, at 30-38.
Based on these data, Professor Blair computes the average such sentence (counting sentences to probation
as zero) to be 12.8 days. See R. BLAIR, supra note 2, at 3. More recently, a survey of average prison
sentences, including probation, for offenders who committed all forms of organizational crimes found the
mean to be 2.8 days. M. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 209 (National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1979).
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fortune may have been his dominant life goal (both in order to enjoy it during
retirement and to pass it on to his heirs).
Little is resolved, however, by conceding that there can be a monetary
equivalent to imprisonment. It is still possible to see the sanction of fines as
the equivalent of Br'er Rabbit's Briar Patch -i.e., the option which the
offender will prefer even though he may protest much to the contrary.
To explain this statement, it is necessary to introduce the concept of the
probability dispersion. Put simply, when a potential offender evaluates the
risk of his actions, he does not assume that he will receive the average
sentence; rather, he must face the possibility that, if convicted, he may receive
any sentence within the authorized range. Thus, there is a conceptual flaw in
using the indifference curve as the starting point from which to analyze the
deterrent effect of different criminal sanctions. The fallacy arises because the
indifference curve ignores the uncertainty that the potential offender faces
when he analyzes the costs and benefits of criminal behavior. Inevitably, there
exists a range of authorized possible penalties for a particular crime (e.g., zero
to three years for price fixing). As a result, even if it were true that there
existed a monetary equivalent for an incarcerative sentence authorized by the
legislature, it does not follow that the probability dispersion for authorized
fines would be congruent with that for incarceration. Further, even if the two
probability dispersions had the same expected mean value (i.e., weighted
average), it would still not necessarily follow that they had equivalent
deterrent effects because of an additional factor called "variance" (which
is
23
simply a measure of the dispersion of outcomes around the mean).
These two factors-mean value and variance-are the central elements in
the approach of standard microeconomic theory to the problem of valuing a
probability dispersion. 24 If we assume a rational hypothetical offender, then
these elements should also be central to his analysis of the potential cost to
him of criminal behavior. Yet, they are ignored by an approach that looks not
at the risk the prospective criminal confronts before the commission of a
crime, but only examines the ability of the sentencing court to find a monetary
penalty that is as severe as the incarcerative sentence it would otherwise
impose. In short, any analysis that starts by postulating an indifference curve
between specific penalties (e.g., a tariff of specific fines and/or terms of
imprisonment) has fallen into the error of looking at the criminal choice
decision retrospectively rather than prospectively. What actually confronts
the potential offender is not a fixed tariff of penalties, but a fundamental
uncertainty as to what the penalty will be within a range of possibilities. It is
this dispersion which must be valued in order to determine the deterrent effect
of criminal sanctions under a rational-actor model.
This critique of the Free Market Model will become clearer after a more
detailed examination of the basic economic theory for decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty. Following this primer, this article will turn to the
real world structure of the probability dispersions for fines versus imprisonment and, ultimately, to the theoretical context in which the two dispersions
have the same mean value. The fundamental premise underlying this inquiry
can, however, be simply stated: the deterrent threat of the law comes not from
23. See W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 20-33 (1970), reprinted in V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS at 984-88 (1972).
24. For a discussion of how a dollar value is assigned to a range of possible outcomes, see id.
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the specific sanction that the court imposes, nor even from the modal (i.e.,
most likely) sanction it may impose, but from the range of possible penalties it
could impose. From this premise, it becomes possible to proceed to two
important conclusions: (1) the dispersion associated with incarceration will
have a greater mean value, and, therefore, a higher deterrent threat; and (2)
the rational offender's attitude toward risk will differ according to the type of
sanction that is to be employed, because of the differing marginal utilities
between additional increments of incarceration and fines.
A. THE MICROECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY IN A NUTSHELL: RISK
PREFERENCE AND RISK AVERSION APPLIED TO THE RATIONAL OFFENDER

Let us start with a real world situation: An investor is considering an
investment in a small start-up company. He consults an investment expert
who estimates the rate of return on the investment will be 10%. However, the
expert concedes that this 10% figure is only a middling guess and acknowledges that, depending on various identifiable contingencies, the rate of return
could range from 5% to 15%. The probability of each such outcome can be
plotted in the form of the probability dispersion in Diagram B.
DIAGRAM B

5%

10%

15%

RATE OF RETURN

The investor now has an estimate of future returns expressed in terms of two
dimensions: the expected mean return (here 10%) and the estimated spread
(here -±-5%). The mean return is simply the weighted average of all possible
outcomes (it need not be the most likely outcome nor need the curve be
symmetrical). In turn, the spread measures the risk associated with the
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investment; typically, it is calculated in terms of the standard deviation from
the mean to the extremities of the dispersion (i.e., the "variance" of the
return). It is widely accepted among both economists and practical businessmen that an investor should be able to choose among competing investments
25
"solely on the basis of these two measures."

Obviously, an investor will prefer a high return to a low return. But what
happens when two probability dispersions have the same expected value but
different degrees of variance, as in Diagram C?

DIAGRAM C

I-
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RATE OF RETURN

This problem has special relevance to our interest in valuing penalty
dispersions. Here, the mean value of both dispersions Aand B is 8, but A has
twice the spread (---4) of B (_ 2). Will the rational investor prefer A to
B because he can do better (the difference between 12% and 10%) or B to A
because A carries a greater downside possibility (the difference between 4%
and 6%)? The answer of microeconomic theory is somewhat tautological: it
depends on whether the person making the choice is a "risk averter" or a
"risk preferrer." A risk preferrer will place greater value on the upside chance
of additional gain than the downside chance of additional loss; vice versa for
the risk averter.
The issue now expands to include the psychology of the relevant population. In general, most economists will agree, with some qualifications, that
individuals generally tend to be risk averters. 26 The most popular reason given
25. W. SHARPE, supra note 23, at 20-33.
26. See D. DEWEY, MODERN CAPITAL THEORY 155 (1965).
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involves the "declining marginal utility of money." 27 In simple terms, the
value of any increment in wealth to an individual decreases as the individual
grows wealthier. As an obvious example, a gain of $10,000 means less to a
multimillionaire than to a pauper. Even proportionate increases have declining marginal utility. A well-known and effective illustration of this concept
(attributed to the mathematician John Von Neumann) posits a case in which
you win a million dollar lottery and then are invited to flip a coin for that
amount, "double or nothing ." Most of us would decline this bet (and are
therefore in this instance risk averters) because the utility of the second
million we could gain does not equal that of the first million we could lose
(i.e., its marginal utility is less).
These concepts can be equally applied to evaluating alternative penalty
structures. Suppose a defendant were faced with a choice between an
indeterminate sentencing structure under which a fine may be imposed in an
amount ranging from zero to $40,000, and a determinate sentencing structure
providing for a fixed fine in the amount of $20,000. If both structures have the
same mean value of $20,000, it can be predicted that the risk averse defendant
would prefer the fixed fine to the sentencing lottery that may result in a
$40,000 fine. Thus, the more indeterminate sentencing structure would have
the higher deterrent value for such a defendant. To put it bluntly, society
maximizes deterrence (other things being equal) by finding the opposite of
what the defendant prefers.
The core idea is that the defendant values his top dollar less than his
bottom dollar. However severe the fine of $20,000 might be in the foregoing
example, the possibility of a $40,000 fine takes him closer to that bottom
dollar and poses a risk of far more disruptive changes in lifestyle which is not
offset by the statistically equivalent possibility that the fine may fall below the
$20,000 mean.
When, however, the risk involves incarceration, this analysis must be
modified. Again, two alternative penalty structures can be hypothesized, as
shown in Diagram D.
Curve A is a relatively indeterminate structure under which the court may
impose anywhere from a zero-to a six-year sentence; curve Bis a more
determinate structure under which a sentence between two and four years is
mandated. If it is assumed that the rational offender is a risk averter, he would
choose Bover A. But the normal reason for assuming the offender to be a risk
averter is absent here. Because we are not dealing with fines or wealth, the
marginal utility of money is basically irrelevant. To be sure, it is even more
likely that there is a declining marginal utility to incarceration, but here this
has the opposite implication. The difference is that in the case of fines, as the
penalty is increased, the offender is taken closer to his bottom dollar and each
increment in the penalty thus becomes disproportionately greater and more
painful. As a result, it is logical to assume that, in the context of fines, the
rational offender would be a risk averter.
27. The assertion that money has a declining marginal utility, while generally accepted, must be
qualified by the recognition that the rate of decline is not constant but rather tends to occur in a series of
quantum leaps. For a summary of the economic literature on this point, see G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 39-41 (1970). Professor Calabresi notes that the "theory of the diminishing marginal utility of
money" was implicitly accepted by Congress when it passed a progressive income tax in which marginal
rates increase with additional income. But see Blum & Katz, The Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 19
U. Ci. L. REV. 417, 455-79(1952).
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DIAGRAM D
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PENALTY IN YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT
In the case of incarceration, however, the declining marginal utility of
imprisonment means that each increment of incarceration increases the
perceived penalty by a less than proportionate amount. Or, reduced to its
simplest terms, a two-year prison term is not twice as bad as a one-year term.
Accordingly, given the choice between any fixed term and a lottery ranging
from zero to twice that fixed term, the rational offender would be a "risk
preferrer" and would opt for the lottery. That is, the offender would choose
the lottery not because he likes risk for its own sake, (i.e., a "true" risk
preferrer), but because for him the potental gains from the lottery outweigh its
potential losses. This is true because he subjectively assigns a higher positive
value to a sentence below the mean than he does a negative value to a sentence
above it. As a result, a sentencing structure which requires a fixed term
exactly equal to the mean of the range of possible sanctions would have
greater deterrent value than a discretionary sentencing structure which
enables the court to impose any sentence within the prescribed limits. Thus,
some significant policy conclusions are suggested by this model: (1) a
determinate sentencing structure for incarcerative sentences generates more
deterrence than an indeterminate one, because the former essentially eliminates a gamble the offender wishes to take; and (2) with respect to fines, an
indeterminate structure generates more deterrence because the offender is
now a risk averter and dislikes variance. In short, specific fine schedules
should not be adopted; rather, a degree of uncertainty should be preserved as
to the likely penalty.
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These conclusions make it important to consider in detail why the marginal
disutility of incarceration declines. A number of independent reasons can be
given. First, the costs of imprisonment are "front-loaded." To begin with,
there is the ceremony of humiliation associated with the surrender to the
marshals and the placing on of handcuffs; then follows the ritual entry into
prison: the first strip search, the assignment of a numeral in place of a name,
body cavity inspections, the decline in personal hygiene, etc. Particularly for
the white -collar offender who is used to the powers and perquisites of
corporate office, the psychic injury that accompanies this sudden powerlessness can be unacceptable. 28 If the initial socialization to prison is brutal and
demeaning, however, we still know from no less a writer than Alexander
Solzhenitsyn that human beings can adapt and endure. For the white-collar
prisoner no less than for Ivan Denisovitch, the unendurable gradually fades
into a more mundane form of misery. 29 Translated into EcoSpeak, the
marginal disutility of each succeeding increment of imprisonment declines.
The second reason which supports this assertion of declining marginal
disutility for incarceration is the wealth loss associated with imprisonment
that may quickly lead to bankruptcy. Thereafter, because no further wealth
loss can occur no matter how long the sentence is extended, the marginal
utility of additional confinement declines to this extent. A similar pattern is
probably associated with the separations and divorces that imprisonment
causes.
Third, traditional economic arguments suggest that incremental units of
imprisonment should be discounted in value (and hence have less of a
deterrent effect). In theory, such discounting may occur because the offender
places a lesser value on the later years of a sentence as a result of either (a) his
expectation that declining health or capacity will make those years less
enjoyable, or (b) his recognition of his own mortality (e.g., a 50-year flat time
sentence cannot meaningfully be imposed against a forty-year-old defendant).
To the extent that this discounting of future years occurs, it makes the
offender a risk preferrer. 30 In terms of our earlier sentencing lottery example,
the offender would prefer gambling on a sentence of between zero and ten
years to electing a five-year sentence. He would do so not because he likes risk
for its own sake, but because he places a lower value on his expected
enjoyment of years six through ten than on years zero through four.
More abstractly, it can be argued that a discount rate is always needed to
equalize present and deferred penalties. 31 Because these arguments about the
28. Consider, for example, the case of John T. Main, a corporate official convicted of price fixing and
sentenced to prison. Hours before his scheduled surrender he committed suicide. The sentence that drove
him to this tragedy was ninety days in jail. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT supra note I, at 32 n. 6.
29. Criminologists have reported that prisoners "become extremely habituated to 'killing time' .
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 277

(1973) [hereinafter NAC CORRECTIONS] (quoting criminologist Daniel Glaser).
30. Block and Lind emphasize the "reduced probability of being alive at a future date" and propose that
"a positive time preference for freedom implies a negative time preference for imprisonment." Block &
Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975).
Without disagreeing, this article places primary emphasis on socialization to prison as the principal reason
for a declining marginal utility to imprisonment.
31. For a discussion of this concept, see V. BRUDNEY AND M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 33.
Where monetary transactions are involved, this is undeniably true because of the time value of money: a
fine of $10,000 today is more severe than a fine of $10,000 next year because interest can be earned during
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discounting of future disutilities are frankly speculative, it is important to
note two independent reasons that support a risk preference hypothesis. First,
empirical studies suggest that organizational offenders acting in groups will
behave differently in making the criminal-choice decision than the solitary
criminal would. A series of such studies have found what is known as the
"risky shift" phenomenon: when acting in a group, individuals will make
more "risky" decisions than when acting alone. 32 If one accepts the premise
that organizational crime typically involves group activity, then the group
may be willing to make a criminal choice where the individual "white-collar"
defendant would be deterred.
Second, the rational offender knows that the sentencing decision can be
permissibly influenced. Sentencing is not a random process, and the application of wealth can affect its outcome, chiefly through the hiring of superior
legal talent. Even if all possible authorized sentences for a given crime were
equally likely from an aggregate statistical viewpoint, the offender still knows
that his odds will be improved if he hires Edward Bennett Williams to
conduct an elaborate sentencing hearing. Although his belief that he can
"beat the odds" applies to fines as well, there it is offset by the declining
marginal utility of money; here, it reinforces the declining marginal utility of
imprisonment.
With the argument made that the offender is a risk averter with respect to
fines and a risk preferrer with respect to imprisonment, certain qualifications
are in order. Undoubtedly, there will be "kinks" in the curve by which the
marginal disutility of incarceration declines. For certain portions of the curve,
the marginal disutility may rise: most evidently, in the case of the very elderly
or terminally ill defendant, and probably also in that portion of the curve
where continued incarceration will bring about divorce or family dissolution.
As a practical matter, this is of limited relevance in the context of "whitecollar" sentencing, in which the authorized sentences seldom exceed five
years and the actual sentences almost never do. In any event, such unique
cases can be specially addressed through clemency or similar mechanisms.
Accordingly, for public policy purposes, our attention should stay focused on
the general tendency for the marginal disutilities of fines and imprisonment to
move in opposite directions: the former to increase, the latter to diminish.
B. APPLYING THE MODEL: FINES VERSUS IMPRISONMENT IN THE REAL
WORLD

In view of the foregoing model, why is the threat of monetary penalties
lower than that of incarceration? First, almost without exception the maximum fine authorized by penal codes is very low, both in absolute terms and
the period of deferral. But, does this conclusion similarly hold true when imprisonment is the sanction?
Arguments can be made on both sides of this question, but clearly a relevant difference is that the time
value of money is not a factor to the same extent because interest does not accrue during the period of
deferral. Some may feel that postponement increases the anxiety. Samuel Johnson did say, after all, that
nothing concentrates the mind like the knowledge that one is to be hanged on a given day. But, Dr.
Johnson's statement goes ultimately more to the intensity of the offender's interest and does not deny that
the offender might pay some price to delay the hanging (even if only temporarily). If the offender would
pay some price to postpone the event (the ultimate "disutility"), the EcoSpeak translation is that some rate
of discount exists with regard to present and delayed disutilities.
32. See text accompanying notes 168-75 infra.
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relative to authorized periods of incarceration for the same crime. In part, this
may be the consequence of rapid inflation eroding the bite of financial
penalties, which were sufficiently severe when originally enacted.In any
event, the briefest tour of the federal criminal code shows the extent of this
disparity. There are at present felonies for which the maximum authorized
fine is $5,000 and the maximum authorized period of imprisonment is 5 years.
This "one year/$1,000" tradeoff is absurd when the average adult's earning
power is in excess of $10,000 per year. 33
To be sure, the actual terms of imprisonment imposed for white-collar
offenders are also low. One study published in 1976 found no case in which a
sentence in excess of nine months had been served by a "true" white-collar
offender for price-fixing. 34 Still, because the incarceration penalty has a much
higher ceiling in the case of most relevant crimes, there is a different
probability dispersion associated with it, and in all likelihood it has a higher
mean value. This result will likely (though not necessarily) be the case
whenever the ceiling on the imprisonment dispersion exceeds that relating to
fines. 35 Here, the question of risk aversion versus risk preference is unlikely to
be significant because the mean values of the two curves are different. 36
The most important basis for predicting that the threat of incarceration
will have a higher mean value than that associated with financial penalties
derives from the existence of what this article will call the "collectability
boundary." 37 Put simply, although it is possible to deprive an individual of
100% of his remaining liberty (i.e., a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole), it is not nearly as feasible to divest him of 100% of his remaining
wealth. Economically, the offender's real wealth consists of both the property
and assets he currently owns and the discounted value of future earnings and
other expected accessions (gifts, inheritances, etc.). Although existing assets
may be seized, future earnings are likely to be beyond the law's effective
reach. Various practical reasons exist for positing this collectability boundary:
(1) It is comparatively simple to hide assets or make fraudulent conveyances
to family members in a manner that the state would eventually find too costly
to challenge; certainly, it would be uneconomic to attempt to reach hidden
earnings under a cost-minimization model that also considers the transaction
costs of enforcement; 38 (2) Modern penal statutes limit the use of fines by an
33. See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., IstSess., 911 (1977). For representative statutory examples, see 18
U.S.C. § 371 ($10,000 fine and/or five years): 18 U.S.C. § 372 ($5,000 fine and/or six years); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1426 ($5,000 fine and/or five years); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 ($2,000 fine and/or five years).
34. See note 22 supra.
35. A higher ceiling does not necessarily imply a higher mean because the frequency of penalties in this
upper range could be very low. However, we are dealing here with the offender's own subjective estimates
of the probabilities of a high sentence, which may be significantly affected by any recently publicized
,.exemplary" sentence.
36. Even if the legislature amends fine schedules to bring them into closer parity with the authorized
periods of incarceration, the rapid pace of inflation will quickly cancel the effect of this reform. This
criticism is less applicable to fine schedules which are geared to a proportion of the offender's earnings, but
such an approach aggravates the collectability problem.
37. For a similar concept, see Block & Lind, supra note 2, at 242-43.
38. Similarly, future earnings can be redirected to a nominee, or recharacterized as the payment of
expenses. It has been reported, for example, that Roy Cohn (against whom the Internal Revenue Service
has lodged a very substantial tax assessment) receives a relatively low salary from his law firm, but an
annual non-accountable expense account of $300,000-$400,000. Auletta, Don't Mess with Roy Cohn,
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"ability to pay" standard and grant the offender the right to a modification
hearing at which he can argue that changed financial circumstances require a
reduction in the fine (which is today usually paid in installments); 39 (3) There
are statutory exemptions which, for example, prohibit taxing transfer payments; and (4) The Constitution may require proof that nonpayment is
attributable to a contumacious refusal to pay.4 0 Thus, even if high fine
schedules were authorized, severe fines which truly approached a significant
portion of the offender's real wealth would still be infrequently imposed, and
would not significantly increase the mean value of the actual probability
dispersion for fines.
Of course, this last point may seem equally applicable to severe prison
sentences which, although authorized, have rarely been imposed. Why do
high possible sentences raise the mean value of imprisonment dispersion if
they are virtually never used? There is both a short and a long answer to this
question. The short answer is that what is past is not necessarily prologue. As
a well-known social philosopher once put it, one need not be a weatherman to
know which way the wind is blowing. A discernible trend exists today toward
greater use of incarceration for "white-collar" offenders, and some stiff
sentences have been imposed. 4 1 In all felony price-fixing cases, the Justice
Department now regularly submits a prosecution sentencing memorandum
42
recommending the imposition of a substantial term of imprisonment.
ESQUIRE, December 5, 1978 at 39, 58. Similar ingenuity presumably would be shown by criminal offenders
to place future earnings beyond the law's effective grasp. Even if these techniques are ultimately found to be
mere shams, the state would incur very high transaction costs in combatting them and might pursue the
offender less vigorously where it must expend its own resources without certainty of success.
39. See, e.g., MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, § 3-403; ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS,
supra note 3, at STANDARD 18-7.4; ALl MODEL PENAL CODE, § 302.3 (P.O.D. 1962); NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 29, at STANDARD 5.5.

40. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); cf Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (imprisonment
beyond statutory maximum solely because of indigency violates the Equal Protection Clause); Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (same).
41. No census of recent sentences for "white-collar offenders" has been here undertaken, but the
following recent cases suggest that leniency cannot be automatically anticipated. In 1975, following his
second conviction for securities fraud, Sidney Stein, a well known stock manipulator, was sentenced to
consecutive federal prison terms totalling ten years. On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded for resentencing, purportedly because of procedural errors at sentencing. United States v. Stein, 544 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1976). Much in the opinion, however, suggests that the court was dismayed at the length of the
sentence given to a defendant who assisted the government after pleading guilty. See especially id. at 104
(Lombard, J., concurring). Still, even if remanded, such a sentence must affect the potential offender's
cost/benefit equation, particularly if he is a risk averter. Robert Beasley, former chief financial officer of
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., is currently serving a four-year federal prison sentence in connection with the
misuse of a corporate slush fund. Former FirestoneExecutive Gives Up Stocks and Benefits, Wash. Post,
Aug. 15, 1979, § D, at 9. A seven-year federal prison term was recently imposed on Cortes Randell, the
former President of National Student Marketing Corp., for the fraudulent manipulation of a real estate
land company.
42. Antitrust Division Memorandum on Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations in Felony Cases
Under the Sherman Act, 270 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (March 1, 1977). The standard memorandum now
submitted to the sentencing judge is attached as an appendix to United States v. Alton Box Board Co.,
[1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) $ 61,336 (N.D.Ill. 1977). In these guidelines, the Antitrust Division
established 18 months as a base recommended prison term for individuals found guilty of felony violations
of the antitrust laws, subject to upward or downward adjustment for aggravating or mitigating facts. In
contrast, the recommended base fine was $50,000 for an individual, and 10% of total sales in the affected
line of commerce during the conspiracy for the corporation. See Beane, Check for Criminal Implications in
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The longer answer is that criminal choices are not made based upon perfect
information. The potential criminal's subjective estimate of the range of
applicable penalties, usually based on available information regarding the
authorized level of sentences, does not necessarily coincide with the historical
facts. Better information is difficult and expensive to acquire; indeed, even
criminologists find it hard to obtain accurate data for many jurisdictions.
Having little prior contact with the criminal justice system, the organizational
offender is apt to be particularly naive in these matters. Moreover, exemplary
severe sentences receive disproportionate publicity-indeed, that publicity is
often a rationale in the mind of the sentencing judge.
Finally, it seems intuitively likely that, at least for middle-to upper-middleclass offenders, the monetary equivalent of even a two-year sentence would be
fairly close to the collectability boundary. 43 If so, it follows that the
imprisonment curve will have a higher mean value because prison sentences
in excess of such a collectability boundary are not implausible (e.g., 5 years).
Thus, if the central assertion is correct that the total range of possibilities, and
not just the modal sentence, deters the offender, then it follows from the
factors just considered-i.e., the current statutory context, the impact of
inflation, the subjective estimates of the offender, and most of all, the
collectability boundary-that the threat of incarceration will have the greater
deterrent value.
C. AN INITIAL SUMMARY AND RESPONSE TO POSNER

The argument to this point has been that the threat of incarceration would
have a greater deterrent value than the threat of fines even if the authorized
ceilings on fines were infinitely high. The collectability boundary implies that
the degree to which the offender can be threatened by monetary penalties is
necessarily lower than in the case of incarcerative sanctions. This conclusion,
as I argue below, is also supported by the difficulty that society would have in
compelling payment of a monetary penalty which was in fact more severe
than the highest authorized incarcerative penalty. A more severe incarcerative range must be authorized to enforce the imposition of fines, because, in
the absence of such a higher threat, the rational offender would simply refuse
to pay the fine and thereby elect imprisonment. No reliance, however, has yet
been placed on arguments about the psychology of the offender (i.e., is he a
risk averter or preferrer?) because we have been basically dealing with the
case in which one dispersion has a higher mean than the other.
In his article, Professor Posner argues that the foregoing argument leads
*'nowhere" because, even if it were true that the range of incarcerative
sanctions applicable to a crime had a higher mean value, the state can simply
44
adjust by changing the rate of exchange between fines and imprisonment.
He also claims that this argument means only that some individuals cannot
pay an optimal fine, but that it has no implication with respect to those cases
Counseling Corporations Today, Nat. L.J., December 31, 1979 at 23. This implicit equation of 18 months

and $50,000 seems a questionable policy judgment for reasons discussed infra in text preceding note 28, but
clearly it will not represent the indifference level for the great majority of offenders, regardless of which
penalty they would prefer to have imposed.
43. Recall the case of John T. Main discussed supra at note 28.
44. Posner, supra note 12, at 414.
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in which the offender can pay such a fine.45 To reply, it is best to start by
placing Posner's arguments into a concrete example. Let us assume that a
given offender would be indifferent between two fixed sanctions, both of
which are adequate to deter him: one year in prison or a fine of $50,000.
However, because the crime is punishable not by a fixed penalty, but by a
range of potentially applicable penalties (hypothetically: zero to ten years or,
alternatively, zero to $250,000), the offender is more deterred by the
incarcerative sentencing range, which (we will assume) has a higher expected
punishment cost because its ceiling is perceived by him to be considerably
higher. Posner's answer to this, I take it, would be to impose whatever higher
fine (perhaps $150,000) carried the same threat as the incarcerative sentencing range, even if this results in the imposition of a fine that is more severe,
standing apart as a single fixed penalty, than the one-year sentence with
which we originally would have been satisfied. Thus, the offender is once
again indifferent betwen the two threats, and, because fines are asserted to
have other advantages, they should be preferred.
Logical as this may sound, there are several serious flaws in this analysis.
First, there may be no monetary equivalent for the discounted value of the
incarcerative threat. For example, under the proposed recodification of the
Federal Criminal Code recently reported out by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the maximum terms of imprisonment for Class A, Band C felonies are life, twenty years and ten years, respectively. 46 If the reader's intuition
matches my own, he will doubt that there is a monetary equivalent to any of
these sentences. Granted that such penalties are seldom imposed, they
nonetheless raise the discounted value of the incarcerative threat-particularly if the potential offender is a risk averter (who by definition focuses on the
maximum penalty in making the criminal choice). In this sense, incarcerative
sentencing ranges provide a kind of "cheap" deterrence by barking more than
they bite.
Second, the collectability boundary constitutes an even more serious
barrier to the kind of exchange rate adjustments that Posner thinks can offset
the greater threat latent in the incarcerative penalty structure. Posner appears
to regard the collectability boundary as just another way of saying that some
individuals cannot afford to pay the optimal fine. But this is too simple.
Almost certainly there are individuals who can afford, but who cannot be
compelled, to pay an optimal fine. 47 Because they can hide assets, divert
expected income, overstate expenses or hire superior legal talent to resist
collection efforts, they can shelter a significant portion of their total wealth
from the court. This will result in the court both underestimating the optimal
fine (assuming, as I do, that the court will wish to fit the fine to the offender)
and granting subsequent motions for a downward modification.
In general, the greater the residual wealth sheltered by the collectability
boundary, the weaker will be the deterrent threat of a fine. In part, this is
because, whatever the level of authorized fines, the relevant legal threat
extends only to this boundary. In contrast, the threat of incarceration for
most felonies extends beyond both this boundary and the further point at
45. Id.
46. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2301 (1978).
47. For examples, see Robinson, Collecting U.S. Criminal Fines: A Headachefor Justice System, Wash.
Post, Dec. 2, 1979 at 1, col. 8.
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which monetary equivalents cease to exist.48 In addition, this boundary
accentuates the effect of the declining marginal utility of money because it
prevents us from approaching the bottom dollar where the loss will be felt
most deeply. If this premise is accepted, then the impact of a fine must be
examined in terms not of its absolute size, nor even of its relative size in
proportion to the offender's total wealth, but rather of the remainder of the
offender's wealth after the fine is imposed. A proportionate fine (e.g., 50% of
the offender's existing assets) is thus almost as discriminatory as a flat fine
(e.g., $25,000) because it takes the low-or middle-income offender closer to his
bottom dollar, and represents for him a subjectively greater sanction. In
theory, this could be compensated for by adopting a progressive schedule
(e.g., a 70% fine for the wealthier offender, 50% for the middle income, and
25% for the poor). But here the collectability boundary interferes by in effect
setting a ceiling on exchange rate adjustments. Indeed, under a system of
severe fines, it might even produce regressive taxation because the level of the
collectability boundary is arguably higher for the wealthier offender (whose
assets tend to be less visible and who can afford the legal costs of resisting
collection). Thus, with respect to Posner's article, the irony here is that the
concept of the collectability boundary is not just another way of saying that
fines do not adequately deter those who cannot pay them; rather, it implies
that those most able to pay them will be the least threatened by them.
Still another problem lurks in any attempt to construct a schedule of
financial penalties carrying the same deterrent threat as incarceration: as a
matter of geometric necessity, any such schedule would have to employ very
high mandatory minimum penalties. If there are some incarcerative penalties
for which a monetary equivalent does not exist (e.g., 20 years), then the fine
schedule would have to start at a higher floor in order to offset this higher
ceiling for incarcerative penalties and produce the same mean. For example,
while the incarcerative schedule of penalties might start at well below one
year and extend to ten years, the lowest financial penalty might have to be the
equivalent of three years if both dispersions were to have the same threat. This
is the flaw in the assumption that exchange rate adjustments between time
and money can be easily made: the result of attaining the same deterrent
threat through fines is the loss of flexibility through the adoption of a rigid
penalty structure with high mandatory minimum fines. In order to deter
wealthy offenders,we would have to provide for minimum fine levels that
would deprive them of a significant portion of their assets. This could be
achieved either by enacting mandatory fines (e.g., $1,000,000) or by requiring
that the fine be equal to a minimum percentage of the offender's assets (e.g.,
50%). Either way, the result is a substantially greater burden on the less
wealthy offender (given the declining marginal utility of money). Politically,
it asks the legislature to create a separate sentencing alternative for only the
48. An example will illustrate: a given offender might be indifferent between a four-year sentence and a
fine equal to 100% of his present wealth. But realistically, he knows that the state cannot deprive him of
more than 70% of his wealth, a level that corresponds for him with a two-year sentence. If the authorized
range ofincarcerative sentences for the crime was one to ten years, and if the mean value of this range were
two and one half years, it would be impossible to engage in the kind of exchange rate adjustment that
Posner assumes can be made. Indeed, even if the mean value of the incarcerative range was only two years,
it would be necessary to threaten all offenders with a mandatory fine set at 70% of their wealth in order to
produce the same mean value for the fine dispersion. Such a fine would of course be very unequal in impact
under our standard assumption that the bottom dollar is subjectively valued higher than the top one.
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wealthiest class of offenders. In short, to be assured of the equivalent
effectiveness of fines, we would have to focus the penalty structure on what
would be a small percentage of offenders. Even then, the risk averter would
prefer the fine penalty structure because it would have less variance than that
associated with incarceration.
Finally, Professor Posner seems to assume that the state can, at no cost to
itself, change the rate of exchange between dollars and time served in prison.
In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that the default rate increases with the
size of the fine. 49 This default rate is already high enough (apparently around
40% in federal courts) 50 to suggest that very high enforcement costs would be
incurred if we were to simultaneously raise and seek to collect the average
fine. If the use of fines appears cheaper today, this may be in large part
because we do not make a more serious effort to collect them.
A theoretical case remains to be considered: what if the probability
dispersion for fines had the same or an even greater mean value than that
pertaining to incarceration? Because this could only occur in an unlikely
world, one in which the collectibility boundary did not exist, a detailed
analysis will be deferred. 5 1 Suffice it to say that even if the mean values were
the same for the two dispersions, the extreme variance which would have to
be structured into the fine dispersion to achieve this result would probably
make a rational offender prefer being subjected to the exterior fine dispersion
over the interior incarceration dispersion. As a probable risk preferrer in this
context, he would be more deterred by the incarceration penalty structure,
which would have a relatively narrower range (i.e., less variance) in terms of
the possible penalties as he subjectively perceived them. If we further
extended the dispersion for fines to give it a higher mean value than that for
incarceration, we encounter an enforcement problem: the rational offender
should not comply unless there is a greater threat (i.e., incarceration held in
reserve).
II: THE COSTS OF SANCTIONS
Even if the deterrent benefits of incarceration exceed that of fines, their
respective costs still must be weighed. Four distinct topics will be examined in
this section: (1) the judicial and transaction costs associated with imposing
the appropriate sanction; (2) the feasibility of the Free Market Model's
formula of determining the optimal penalty; (3) the "passing on" question-i.e., on whom does the incidence of a financial penalty actually fall; and
(4) the issue of demoralization costs-i.e., are there costs beyond those
recognized by a cost-minimization model? The answers this article reaches
will again find the conventional wisdom more right than wrong.

49. See
50. The
imposed in
51. See

text accompanying note 60 infra.
Justice Department's criminal fine collection supervisor has estimated that 40% of the fines
fiscal 1977 and 1978 had not been paid in full as of the end of 1979. Robinson, supra note 47.
text accompanying notes 182-89 infra.
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A. THE RELATIVE COSTS TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The Free Market Model assumes that the use of fines will be substantially
less costly to the criminal justice system. 52 But this assumed disparity between
fines and imprisonment may be overstated. While prisons are, of course,
expensive, 53 no approach could be more uneconomic than to look solely at
their total cost. The unforgiveable sin in economics is to deviate from a rapt
concentration on marginalcost. For a variety of reasons, the marginal cost of
administering a "taste of jail" to the "white-collar" offender is likely to be
relatively low. The rising median age of our population implies that prison
populations will soon be declining (the 20-to-30 year age bracket being the
primary source of incoming prisoners).5 4 Even more important, the unique
characteristic of minimum security prisons (in which nearly all "white-collar"
offenders are housed) is their tendency to operate well below capacity, in part
because of the increasing popularity of intermediate sentencing alternatives. 55
Finally, any increase in expenditures caused by incarcerating the organizational criminal can be balanced by decreasing the average sentence given to
other criminals.56 Because there is widespread agreement that average prison
sentences imposed in the United States are excessively long (particularly by
European standards), 57 little social harm appears likely to come from such a
trade-off. Indeed, this idea of compressing the sentencing spectrum at both
ends seems to underlie most of the recent determinate sentencing proposals
that promise "fair and certain punishment." 5 8 Of course, one could reduce the
average prison sentence without increasing sentences at the bottom end of the
spectrum, thereby realizing even greater social cost savings. But, this ignores
the political compromise that has made determinate sentencing proposals so
seductively attractive to both conservatives and civil libertarians alike: "less
for most, but some for all" is a slogan which, when run up the legislative
flagpole, apparently will cause a majority to salute.
In contrast to imprisonment, what costs are associated with the use of
fines? First, high enforcement costs appear likely whenever installment
payments are permitted. Despite the considerable reliance that English courts
place on fines as a primary sanction, one survey of the English experience has
found that 23% of all defendants had not completed payment within eighteen
months.5 9 Even more ominously, that study also found that the default rate
52. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 168-69.
53. In 1975, the cost of administering the nation's prisons was estimated to be over one-half billion
dollars. L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HOURS OF DARKNESS 3 (1975).

54. For the conclusion that the ages of 20-30 represent the "prison age bracket" see Flanagan, Crisis in
Prison Populations, in CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 61, 62 (2d ed. 1977).

55. "One generalization about the future of minimum security facilities seems warranted. As society
finds still more noninstitutional and community-based solutions to its problems, the rural open institutions
will become harder and harder to populate. Already they are operating farther below their rated capacities
than any other type of correctional facility." NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 29, at 346 (emphasis added).
56. For a discussion of this possibility, see Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1072 (1978).
57. See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, at STANDARD 18-2.1 for a discussion of
comparative sentencing practices.
58. See, e.g.. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975);
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).

59. Carter & Cole, The use of fines in England: could the idea work here?, 63 JUDICATURE 154, 159
(1979).
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increased with the size of the fine: 55% of all fines over one hundred pounds
had not been paid within eighteen months. 60 The American experience,61
although limited, also suggests that a high default rate must be expected.
The costs associated with the imposition of fines are compounded if an
attempt is made to equalize them with some incarcerative penalty. Now, not
only are enforcement costs incurred, but the hidden transaction costs of the
judicial process must also be recognized. The task before a court seeking to
determine a monetary penalty equivalent to a period of incarceration seems
Herculean. To begin with, if money has a declining marginal utility, the
severity of a fine must depend not simply on its absolute size, but also on its
relation both to the offender's current wealth and to the net present value of
his expected future earnings and liabilities. Such a calculation would challenge the best of actuaries and would have little reliability when applied to the
case of an individual offender (as opposed to a statistically significant sample).
To even attempt such a calculation, one would have to postulate a discount
rate that equalized present versus deferred consumption. In addition, one
would have to estimate both an expected retirement date and future liabilities
(including those relating to future offspring). Because an offender would
ordinarily have every incentive to misrepresent these facts, there could be
little confidence in the final result. Moreover, the cost to the judicial system of
engaging in this wild goose chase is largely invisible. Beyond the direct costs
(such as that of the prosecutor's time in challenging defense counsel), there
are the hidden imputed costs in terms of judicial delay, cases not heard, and
cases summarily decided by a court seeking to clear its crowded docket.
The model proposed by Professor Becker avoids these complexities,
however, by making no effort to find equivalence between fines and incarceration. "Optimal fines," he writes, ".

.

. depend only on the marginal harm and

cost and not at all on the economic positions of the offenders." 62 In effect,
Becker is saying that whether the fine hurts the middle class offender more
than the millionaire is irrelevant; it is only important that the expected
punishment cost exceed the expected gain from the crime. For Becker, the
expected punishment cost of a penalty is basically its severity discounted by
the risk of apprehension; thus, a $100,000 fine and a 10% risk of conviction is
the equivalent of a $10,000 fine and a 100% certainty of conviction. 63 Others
have questioned this analysis, asserting that a third variable is the offender's
own position on the continuum between absolute risk aversion and absolute
risk preference, 64 but this complication can be deferred for the moment
60. Id. at 159-60.
61. Forty percent of the fines levied in federal courts in fiscal 1977 and 1978 had not been paid in full as
of December 1979, and over $78 million in fines remained then unpaid. See Robinson, supra note 47
(quoting Ronald Roos, criminal fine collection supervisor for the Department of Justice). In a number of
cases detailed in the Washington survey the reason for delinquency appears not to have been insolvency,
but rather deliberate defiance. Presumably, the rate of such delinquency would increase if even greater use
of fines is made as more marginal cases are so disposed and limited enforcement resources become even

more overloaded.
62. G. BECKER, supra note 1, at 65.

63. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 167.
64. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 120-29. Professor Posner does acknowledge that
"preferences for and against risk" are relevant, R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 170, but does not seriously
engage this issue. Presumably, if it could be demonstrated that a given class of criminals were risk
preferrers, he would reply that the penalty level should be increased even further in order to
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because the basic issue is whether even Becker's simpler formula can be
implemented.
The first problem is that a reliable means for determining the probability of
apprehension does not exist because the total amount of "white-collar" crime
is unknown. 65 This absence of a dependable census is not wholly unique to the
context of organizational crime. But while other crimes, such as rape or child
abuse, also go unreported, there are alternative methods of estimation such as
anonymous self-reporting surveys or medical studies. The unique characteristic of most "white-collar" crimes, however, is that the victim is unaware of his
injury. In general, the IRS does not know it has been defrauded, the consumer
lacks knowledge that he has overpaid as a result of price fixing, the
competition seldom realizes it has lost a profitable contract because of an
illegal payment, and the cancer victim rarely learns that an unsafe drug
consumed long ago was carcinogenic. Even more perplexing is the tendency
for "white-collar" crime to be definitional: is conscious parallelism in the
setting of prices among industry leaders the same as price fixing? Was a
particular tax deduction arguable or fraudulent? Was the adverse fact not
disclosed in an SEC filing material or immaterial? Any census of "whitecollar" crime first requires knowledge of what constitutes the crime in
question, and here there is considerable doubt.
Not only is the amount of such crime uncertain, but so are the gains
derived from it. The corporate officer seldom benefits directly in any tangible
sense from most organizational crime. The gain is more likely to be promotion
or, at least, avoidance of a loss (i.e., dismissal or replacement in office). To
quantify such intangible gains (as Becker's formula requires) appears an even
more complex task than that required under a formula that only seeks to
equate the severity of different forms of sanctions. Thus, a basic dilemma of
the "economic approach" to non-market transactions comes into clearer
focus: it is a theory whose validity depends on data that cannot as a practical
matter be gathered to verify or disconfirm it.
This conclusion should not be overread as an obituary for the economic
approach. Although Becker's model vastly outdistances the possibility of
reliable data because both the gain and risk of apprehension in his formula
prove non-quantifiable in practice, the other alternative, however, is to focus
on achieving a truer equivalence between incarcerative and non-incarcerative
66
sanctions. This possibility is discussed in more detail below.
B. WHO BEARS THE COSTS? THE PASSING-ON PHENOMENON

A moment's reflection leads one to recognize that when a fine is imposed
on an organizational official, its real incidence often falls on the organization
and ultimately on its owners, employees, creditors, and customers. This
assertion, that the organization itself does not bear the cost, is hardly original
and has been acknowledged by the Model Penal Code and assorted legal
overcompensate for their relative insensitivity to high penalties. But see text accompanying notes 43-49
infra.
65. For a representative statement that the total amount and social cost of "white-collar" crime is not
currently capable of estimate, see E. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND LEGAL SOURCES
OF CRIME IN AMERICA 161-62(1969).
66. See part I1 D, at pp. 449-56 infra.
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scholars as a reason for employing caution in the use of punitive fines against
corporations. 67 Indeed, it is ironic that, to the extent that the cost of the fine is
ultimately passed on in the form of higher prices (which happens to some
extent when competition in the product market is imperfect), the consumer,
who was in all likelihood the intended beneficiary of the violated statute,
becomes the only true victim.
The ease with which the fine may be passed on by the convicted official to
the organization is exemplified by section 5 of the Model Business Corporation Act. 68 Adopted by roughly half the states, it permits a fine to be
indemnified if the defendant acted in the corporation's best interests and
without reasonable grounds to believe his conduct was illegal. 69 Although this
standard may be appropriate, the catch is that the determination of the
defendant's good faith is made not by the court but, rather, by corporate
insiders such as disinterested members of the board of directors, by the
shareholders, or by outside legal counsel. 70 Because such persons may be
7
dominated by, or dependent upon, the defendant seeking indemnification, 1
there is a possibility-which rises with the convicted official's level in the
corporate hierarchy-that section 5's "good faith" requirement will be
enervated in practice. Of course, even when indemnification is not formally
sought in accordance with section 5, it still may be achieved covertly through
higher salaries or fringe benefits.
The Free Market Economist denies none of this, but argues that the same
situation occurs when the defendant is incarcerated. 72 As a result, these
economists assert that the costs of illegality should be visited directly upon the
firm rather than upon the individual. The issue is framed thus: can the cost of
incarceration be similarly passed on? For two reasons, such a covert
indemnification payment to the official would have to come after his
conviction. First, the risk of apprehension for the crime is too low to justify a
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment (P.O.D. 1964). Similar observations have recently been
made by Francis Allen. See Allen, "Regulation by Indictment: The Criminal Law as an Instrument of
Economic Control," Graduate School of Business Administration, The University of Michigan (1978) at
13 (noting that the burden of criminal fines "falls directly on the owners, the stockholders, who ordinarily
will have had no part in the commission of the offenses, will have been unaware that criminal acts were
being committed, and, even if suspicious of criminal activity, will often have lacked the means to do much
about preventing it.").
68. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5(a) (1974) permits indemnification of fines if the employee
or agent of the corporation "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in the best
interests of the corporation, -nd, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful."
69. Id.
70. Id. at § 5(d).
71. See Barrett, Mandatory Indemnificationof Corporate Officers and Directors, 29 Sw. L.J. 727 (1975).
72. See McKean, Should Corporate Managers' Liability for Third-Party Injuries Be Expanded? in THE
ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES SOURCEBOOK 86 (1978). While McKean
argues that managers would demand additional compensation for assuming additional legal risks, he does
acknowledge that full compensation will not be possible; thus, he asserts, managers will provide fewer
services for the same price. Over time, risk-taking specialists will also appear on the scene to assume such
risks. This analysis, however, seems to ignore the more obvious possibility: the manager may refuse to
perform the illicit service for which he cannot be fully compensated--exactly the result society wishes to
achieve. There is a failure in McKean's analysis to distinguish between vicarious liability for negligence
(which may in theory lead to management demanding additional compensation or performing fewer
services) and liability for the conduct of the agent. If, as McKean concedes, the agent cannot be fully
compensated, deterrence should work.
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sizeable advance payment.7 3 Second, the corporation could not be certain that
it would get the value expected from an anticipatory payment because it
would be unable to enforce the bargain (which is clearly against public
policy).
Although instances can be cited in which convicted corporate officials have
been given special compensation following their conviction (seemingly as a
bonus for their combat duty),74 there are two fatal flaws in any assertion that
the corporation will always so reward its fallen foot soldiers. First, it ignores
the near-perfect competition for promotion within the firm. The incarceration
of an official, even briefly, creates a vacancy that is quickly filled, at little or
no cost to the corporation. Because his replacement will wish to obtain the job
on a permanent basis, the convicted corporate official knows that, if he is
incarcerated, he is likely to lose his present office within the corporation.
Accordingly, there is an injury to the incarcerated corporate official quite
distinct from simply the loss of liberty through confinement. Particularly
since the motivation for involvement in the crime was likely to have been
promotion in, or retention of, office (rather than direct tangible gain), the
deterrent value of the likelihood of ouster seems substantial in the case of
organizational officials.
Second, there are multiple legal barriers to making legally gratuitous
payments to outsiders (such as the ousted official). A derivative suit may lie
where such a payment is publicly made, and it is much more difficult to justify
or disguise a payment to a non-employee. 75 Even usually passive directors are
apt to balk at such a payment, as the former chairman of Gulf Oil found when
his board revolted upon learning that he rehired a convicted Gulf lobbyist and
confessed bagman. 76 Finally, SEC proxy disclosure requirements create an
"embarrassment cost" in the case of public companies by attracting adverse
77
publicity and media attention.
73. Cf Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the
Battle Against White Collar Crime, II AM. CRIM. L. REV. 959, 969 & n.34 (1973).
74. Gulf Oil Corp., for example, rehired its convicted lobbyist under a special consulting contract after
he had been convicted of making illegal political contributions on Gulfs behalf. Robertson, The Directors
Woke Up Too Late At Gulf FORTUNE, June 1976, at 208. In part, of course, these arrangements or similar
pension and employment contract settlements may be designed to ensure the continued cooperation of an
official who could otherwise "blow the whistle." See note 137 infra.
75. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 488 (2d ed. 1970) ("Retroactive compensation for past
services is usually regarded as without consideration and a gift of corporate assets," case citations omitted'
76. See Robertson, supra note 74; "The Hot Seat: Outside Directors Get Tough After Payoff Scandals,"
Wall St. J., March 24, 1976, at 1, col. 6; Barmash, "Heads Rolling in the Board Room," N.Y. Times, Oct.
17, 1976, § 3, at 1,col. 4.
77. However debatable the theory of "ethical materiality" may be, case law has begun to require
disclosure of information relating to the integrity and character of management. See Maldonado v. Flynn,
597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979) (directors' modification of a stock option plan for personal gain at company
expense was material and should have been disclosed); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (proxy materials should have disclosed that four directors failed to advise the
board that an outside firm hired to determine a fair value for Rust Craft stock owned debentures
convertible into that stock); SEC v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (disclosures
required concerning allegedly improper marketing practices and transaction with Spanish affiliates); SEC
v. Kalvex, 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (director violated federal securities laws by soliciting proxies
without disclosing that he had falsified expense vouchers and accepted kickbacks); Rafal v. Geneen, [197273 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH)
93,505 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (required disclosure of the fact that
three directors were being sued for "inside trading"); Cooke v. Teleprompter, 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
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There is some empirical corroboration of these assertions. When the
Chairman and President of Fruehauf Corporation were convicted of income
tax fraud, committed on the corporation's behalf, the directors of that
company undertook a survey of the recent experiences of corporations in
similar predicaments. 78 They found twenty-five corporations whose officials
had been or were being prosecuted for crimes committed on behalf of their
corporations between 1971 and 1978. Perhaps surprisingly, only "about a
third" of these executives retained their positons. 79 This was in marked
contrast to the electrical equipment price fixing conspiracy of the 1950's, in
which most of those convicted either remained in office or moved to
equivalent positions elsewhere.8 0 Arguably, the later results suggest that the
"embarrassment costs" associated with SEC proxy disclosures have been
heightened substantially in the interval.
On closer examination, the Fruehauf survey yields even more specific data
to confirm the hypothesis that imprisonment will cause a loss of corporate
office. In three out of four cases in which more than a symbolic prison term
was imposed, the convicted employee either "resigned" or did not return to
an equivalent office. 8' In contrast, resignation or displacement following a
fine seems to have been less frequent and largely limited to those cases in
which the convicted official's conduct became a matter of public notoriety.
Cases in which a convicted chairman or chief executive officer retained office
after a fine were especially evident. 82 Indeed, Fruehauf itself eventually
followed this pattern, restoring its top official to office after a brief term of
community service working with an alcoholic rehabilitation center. 83 A vicepresident of the company even remarked that, "It was like [he] was there all
the time looking over our shoulders." 8 4 This hardly seems an exaggeration
drove to work at the rehabilitation
given the report that the convicted official
center in the company's limousine. 85
1971) (directors did not meet their duty of disclosure where proxy materials made misleading statements
related to the possibility of their bribery convictions being reversed on appeal). The leverage points
available to a dissident shareholder have also grown, as courts have ordered stockholder meetings to be
postponed until such disclosures were made. Bergman, 454 F. Supp. at 794; Cooke, 334 F. Supp. at 474.
Still other means of raising the "embarassment cost" to management are shareholder proxy proposals and
increased disclosure regarding executive compensation and fringe benefits. See generally Purcell, Management and the "Ethical" Investor, 57 HARV. Bus. REV. No. 5, 24 (Sept.-Oct. 1979) ; Schwartz & Weiss, An
Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1977).
78. Loving, How Bob Rowen Served His Time, FORTUNE, August 27, 1979, at 44.
79. Id.
80. See Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work? 61 CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1337 (1973).
81. See Nathan, Coddled Criminals,HARPER'S, January 1980, at 30-33, for a complete breakdown of the
Fruehauf data. In only four cases (AMREP Corp., Borman's Inc., Technical Tape Inc., and Teleprompter
Corp.) were sentences of two months or more actually imposed, and in all of these, except that of Technical
Tape, the imprisoned officer did not return to an equivalent office. In both cases where the sentence was in
excess of one year, the officers resigned and have apparently not been rehired.
82. The Chief Executive Officers of Ashland Oil, Braniff Airways, Carnation, Occidental, and U.S.
Gypsum all retained office after a felony conviction followed by a fine without imprisonment, and the Chief
Executive Officer of Northrop was similarly reinstated to office. Id. at 32-33.
83. Loving, supra note 78, at 44.
84. Id. at 43. Fortune also reported that the convicted president "never doubted that he would
eventually get his old job back" and saw his position as one of "honorable martyrdom." Id. There is thus a
strong likelihood that another difference separates fines and similar non-incarcerative sanctions from
imprisonment: there is less stigmatization associated with their use.
85. Id.
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Accordingly, while fines may sometimes be passed on, the likelihood of
ouster when an official is imprisoned makes de facto indemnification far more
difficult and improbable. This conclusion should not be overread to mean that
de facto indemnification cannot be prevented. In principle, prevention seems
possible by a variety of means, such as the use of a probation condition
disqualifying the convicted official from organizational office. 86 But, absent
such an incapacitive sanction (which, although now given a qualified
endorsement by the ABA, is not yet in general use8 7), the deterrent effect of

fines on a senior decision-maker within the firm remains highly suspect.
C. THE COSTS OF INEQUALITY

Under the Free Market Model, the size of a fine is equal to the anticipated
gain divided by the probability of conviction. Thus, if the apprehension risk is
10% and the expected gain $10,000, the fine would be $100,000.88 The fine is
not adjusted to reflect wealth differences between different offenders, although a fine that would bankrupt most might obviously seem trivial to a
multi-millionaire. In short, although the law forbids the rich and the poor
alike to sleep under bridges and steal bread, even this faint notion of equality
fades when the severity of the sentence is inversely related to the wealth of the
offender.
This unequal allocation of the costs of punishment can be criticized from a
variety of jurisprudential perspectives. 89 But, from the perspective of a "costminimization" model, such inequality is more a virtue than a vice. If the goal
is to reduce the aggregate of the three cost components recognized by such a
model (i.e., the cost of injury to the victim, the cost of punishment to the
offender, and the transaction costs to the judicial system), then equality as a
criterion for the allocation of punishment becomes a wasteful luxury because
it may require us to impose more punishment than is minimally necessary to
deter the individual (or class of offenders) in question. Indeed, the path of cost
minimization, if followed rigorouosly, leads to an even more extreme result: if
prison sentences are the primary form of criminal sanction, they should be
shorter for the wealthy organizational offender than for the equally culpable
lower level employee convicted of the same crime because their time/money
trade-offs differ. That is, because the executive's time has a higher monetary
value than the employee's, the interference with the executive's incomeproducing capacity is clearly a more severe sanction. In this light, to impose
86. Case law concerning the court's power to impose an organizational or professional disqualification
as a condition of probation is ably summarized in Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1237-38 n.60 (D.D.C.
1974) (upholding condition barring convicted union leader from exercising leadership role in former
union).
87. See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, at STANDARD 18-2.8. Cf ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 17-A, § 1153(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-303(2). Great Britain has long authorized a court to
disqualify certain officials from office. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 188, at 554.
88. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
89. I have elsewhere attempted to outline a Rawlsian model, which inhibits the loading of costs of crime
prevention in a manner which prejudices the socially disfavored. See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1080-92. The
"Just Deserts" theorist also has his model, which would similarly find such an allocation of punishment to

be unfair because it is not related to individual culpability. See R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT at 27-34 (1970) (noting the overlap between Rawlsian and Just Desert
models). The economist, however, asks only if an allocation is "efficient," not whether it is "fair."
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the same sentences on the senior executive and the subordinate levies a deadweight loss on society, which loses the productive capacity of the senior
executive to an unnecessary extent.
The point of this analysis is not to recommend shorter sentences for the
more highly paid, but to demonstrate that a cost-minimization model, unless
qualified, leads to results which seem inconsistent with our basic moral
precepts. This is even clearer in another application of the cost-minimization
model's reasoning: Because the model seeks only to minimize the sum of the
three cost components noted above, and assigns no priority among them, the
interests of the victim are not given any preference over those of the offender.
This causes little problem when only fines are employed, because the fine is a
transfer payment from the offender to the victim and thus imposes no deadweight loss on society. But when imprisonment is retained as a criminal
sanction, the model requires an inquiry into whether the crime causes a social
injury greater than the transaction costs to the judicial system of preventing
it. This is not a wholly inappropriate inquiry in, for example, the case of
marijuana laws. 90 In the abstract, however, it may lead to less justifiable
results: a serious crime that is costly to prosecute (as most "white-collar"
crimes would be), and which would result in the imprisonment of a senior
executive in order to protect victims who make little monetary contribution to
society, merits, under this theory, little prosecutorial attention. Or, in more
concrete terms, one should not imprison the drug company executive who
engages in fixing prices of drugs for the elderly, because the loss to society
from the crime is arguably less than that associated with convicting and
imprisoning the offender. 9t Yet, crimes that are less grave in terms of their
moral seriousness would still be vigorously prosecuted because convictions
could be obtained more cheaply (in part because the offender has less
resources to expend in his defense). In short, alone Indeed unde suc model on
abandon th goa o preventing crime and turns instead to the morally
ambiguous task of determining the optimal number of offenses, i.e., the point
at which the harm to the victims equals the costs of punishment and
apprehension.
Because a cost-minimization model produces results at marked variance
with common morality, it is important to emphasize that such a model is not
synonymous with the economic approach in general. Indeed, criticism of a
cost-minimization approach is possible even within a utility-maximizing
frame of reference. First, other economists have objected that the Free
Market
90. Should judicial enforcement costs count equally on a dollar-for-dollar basis with the loss suffered by
the victim and the costs imposed on the offender? Although a cost minimization model assumes this, a
counter-argument has been framed by Professor Calabresi in a related context. Dealing with the costs of
accidents, he argues that the secondary losses resulting from accidents can be reduced by "spreading them
broadly." That is, loss spreading minimizes the perceived injury. G. CALABRESi, THE CosTs OF
ACCIDENTS 40 (1970). Within the criminal law context, the costs of obtaining convictions and maintaining
a correctional system are secondary losses which are automatically spread over the relevant population
(i.e., taxpayers) in contrast to the primary costs of crime which fall on a few (i.e., the victim). Thus, even
under a cost-minimization model, these secondary costs can to a degree be discounted in value.
91. It is assumed in this example that the offender will be expensive to convict because he will hire the
best legal talent available to conduct a prolonged defense. On the other side of the equation, a purely
utilitarian approach to determining the cost of the offense might discount the injury to the victim (who may
indeed have been unable to afford the drug in question and so suffered extensively) by the victim's
advanced age, unemployed status, and limited life expectancy. Thus, the cost to society of preventing the
crime could exceed the injury to the victim (either in an individual case or the generic crime category).
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school tends to ignore the costs of income redistribution. 92 Our society today
expends substantial resources in the form of social welfare transfer payments
toward the goal of reducing income disparities. Yet, inequality in the use of
imprisonment undercuts this goal because it reduces the wealth of the
offender's family and dependents. Additional social resources must therefore
be expended simply to prevent even more regressive income disparities from
developing, and these expenditures represent a dead-weight loss. While
imprisoning the wealthy offender may also create a dead-weight loss, there is
at least an income leveling effect and the taxpayer is not asked to offset this
loss through additional transfer payments.
Second, and more important, there is the concept of "demoralization
costs." 93 If, as the Free Market Model emphasizes, society suffers a loss when
a productive citizen is incarcerated because we are deprived of his earning
capacity, a necessary balancing observation must also be made: when persons
are treated unequally in an area in which they believe equal treatment is a
right, both they and their sympathizers (a potentially much larger group)
suffer psychic injury that may lead them either to reduce their contributions
to society, or to take anti-social actions in revenge. This theme has been best
articulated by Professor Michelman, who observed that such costs will be
greatest to society when "a loss has evidently been occasioned by deliberate
social action" 94-a definition for which inequality in the use of criminal
sanctions supplies a paradigm. While demoralization costs can arise in many
contexts (Professor Michelman was focusing on the power of eminent domain
when he coined the term), they pose more acute problems in the criminal
context in which insurance is not possible. That is, although one can insure
against the risk that his property will be condemned at below fair market
value, one cannot insure against the danger of an unfair prison sentence. 9' As
a result, when different forms of criminal sanctions are employed, it is
essential that a serious effort be made to achieve equivalence among them.
Rough justice of the kind Professor Posner proposes, when he suggests that a
loose estimate of equivalence is sufficient, 96 aggravates this problem because a
casual attitude implicitly expresses disdain for the liberty interests of the
socially less favored.
The concept of demoralization costs can be placed in a more generalized
economic framework. Briefly put, both a crime and its punishment can create
externalities which are borne by persons other than the victim and the
offender. Obviously, crime causes psychic injury to persons other than the
victim (e.g., those unwilling to walk the streets of their neighborhood in the
aftermath of a mugging). But, unequal punishment similarly can cause a
psychic injury to those of the same racial or economic group as the offender.
Thus, an externality- may result when the criminal justice system fails to
achieve equivalence among the severity of the various forms of sanctions it
employs, or when it seeks only to set the punishment at a level sufficient to
92. See Polinsky, supra note 2, at 1671, 1676-79.
93. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-17 (1967).
94. Id.
95. Even if insurance were possible, the discriminatory effect remains because only those subject to the
risk would have to pay the premium. This is in contrast to the context discussed by Professor Michelman,
in which everyone is more or less subject to the risk of a taking without just compensation.
96. Posner. supra note 12, at 413.
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cancel out the expected gain without regard for the differing impact of the
same punishment on different offenders.
Properly understood, the logic of utility maximization requires a survey of
the interests of a greater cross-section of society than that focused upon by the
Free Market Model. The latter model seems to consider only the offender, the
victim, and the taxpayer who bears the cost of law enforcement. But, once we
introduce into our cost/benefit calculus the concept of social sympathizers
and psychic injuries, the neat symmetry that a cost minimization approach
seems to promise quickly fades.
D. A MODEST PROPOSAL: IMPLEMENTING THE ECONOMIC APPROACH IN A
SYSTEM OF MULTIPLE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

So far, it has been asserted that the conventional wisdom has considerable
validity even from an economic perspective: incarceration is a greater
deterrent than fines, and monetary penalties are likely to involve substantial
unrecognized judicial transaction costs. If, as a result, we abandon the use of
fines, however, we also substantially sacrifice the goal of victim compensation. Indeed, if we simply downgrade the role of fines to that of a
supplementary penalty which is added onto a sentence of incarceration, the
goal of restitution will thereby be made much more difficult to achieve-both
because it is difficult to enforce an order of restitution against an already
incarcerated offender and because the offender will probably suffer a substantial wealth loss which will deplete his ability to make restitution.
Thus, there are reasons for prefering a mixed system of criminal sanctions,
under which the offender may be either imprisoned or fined, to a system
which uses only a single sanction. Particularly if the offender is uncertain of
the form of the sanction that will be imposed (e.g., a fine, incarceration, or,
possibly, community service), it may be possible to combine both the
additional deterrence that incarcerative penalties provide and the restitution
that fines can fund.
Although to this point fines and incarceration have been evaluated as two
alternative penalty dispersions, it may now be inquired if the two can be
integrated. Put more abstractly, crime can be viewed in economic terms as
simply another commodity which the potential offender may purchase at a
price determined by the risk of conviction and punishment. What is unique
about the market in which this purchase is made is that the commodity to be
purchased trades concurrently at two different, erratically fluctuating prices
expressed in two different currencies: some offenders pay a price which can be
stated in terms of the risk of a fine; others pay in terms of the risk of
imprisonment. Such situations can briefly arise in other markets; for example,
a stock may simultaneously trade at different prices on the floors of the
Pacific Coast and New York Stock Exchanges. But such price disparities are
quickly equalized through the process of arbitrage: an astute trader noticing
the price disparity will buy on one exchange and at the same time sell on the
other until the prices on both exchanges are again in alignment. But it is
exactly this arbitrage mechanism that is missing from the market in crime.
Without it, there are in effect two crime markets, one in dollars and the other
in years, and price disparities between them are inevitable even if discrimination were not a factor. There is thus a structural problem here that cannot be
resolved by simply instructing judges to be wise, good, and sensitive.
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On the theoretical level, the answer is simple: merge the two markets by
somehow developing an arbitrage capacity. This is easier said than done,
however; on the practical level, it brings us back to the problems of
discrimination and demoralization costs. In reality, unless special safeguards
are developed, monetary sanctions are likely to be utilized largely in the cases
of wealthy defendants, while incarcerative sanctions will remain the norm for
other offenders. Accordingly, the following model attempts to reduce the
discrimination that now surrounds the use of multiple forms of criminal
sanctions. As a by-product, it offers an approach to combining the added
threat that incarceration affords with the compensation that fines make
possible. Because this model will seem repugnant to many, it seems best to
concede at the outset that it is advanced primarily for its formal logic; a
"second best" solution will be substituted at the conclusion of this section.
The basic concept to be developed involves introducing a degree of
competition into the sentencing process, but only among the similarlysituated,
in order to reduce the disparities that accompany the use of different forms of
sanctions. Earlier, the problem of finding a monetary equivalent to incarceration had seemed intractable, stalemated by the complexities of identifying the
wealth loss that was most appropriate to the unique status of each individual
offender. Nonetheless, a heretical suggestion here deserves consideration: let
the market do it. This is, of course, the traditional prescription of the
economist. Here, it means that, if a monetary equivalent to incarceration
cannot be safely (or efficiently) determined through a regulatory process, it
may still be possible for a competitive process to produce a near equivalent.
It may be easiest to introduce this suggestion by way of analogy. In the
business planning context, the buy-sell agreement is a well known device for
avoiding the transaction costs, uncertainty, and gamesmanship inherent in
determining the value of a going business through litigation. 97 Under it, two
co-owners might provide that if one wished to dissolve the firm, he would be
required to specify a price at which he was willing either to sell his half
interest or to buy the interest of the other. The other party then has the option
to buy or sell at the specified price. Thus, if the latter thinks the offered price
is too low, he will buy; if too high, he will sell. Although this approach has its
defects (which are concededly paralleled here), its virtue is the substitution of
a generally feasible approximation of the firm's fair value for expensive and
time consuming litigation in which the relative skill of the advocates may be
decisive.
Transposed to the punishment context, a first step in this direction might
be to require the offender to specify his own indifference curve between fines
and incarceration. If the trade-off seemed biased in favor of fines, the court
would have the option to impose incarceration. The offender would thereby
be effectively estopped from arguing that the sentence was unfair, unless his
alternative disposition (which he acknowledged as its equivalent) also seemed
unfair. The net effect would be that to "buy" his freedom, the offender would
be given an incentive to specify a high fine.
How would such a system work? The offender could be asked prior to
sentencing to specify his own monetary trade-offs for the applicable guideline
97. For a discussion of the use of such a negotiation device in another business context, see Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HAV. L. REv. 353, 394 (1979) (similar procedure used to divide
estate between two claimants).
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sentencing ranges (in essence, this would yield a series of indifference curves).
Or, more feasibly, the court could specify a tentative prison sentence and
then, in effect, permit the offender to make a monetary bid. If the middle class
offender does have an extreme aversion to imprisonment, as legions of
commentators have suggested, such a structure is designed to maximize the
fine he will offer to pay.
If this seems to involve the disquieting spectacle of "purchased justice" and
consequent demoralization to those unable to make an attractive offer, several
answers to this objection are possible. First, no offer would necessarily be too
low. Because the fines could be paid in installments, the poor as well as the
rich could bid. To assist the court in evaluating the offer, supplemental
information concerning the offender's wealth and liabilities could be provided
by the offender under oath to the court and verified in the pre-sentence
report. 98 In addition, offers could be made in terms of community service.
Thus, for example, to create a different kind of currency and reduce wealth
disparities, a convicted accountant might offer five hundred hours of auditing
the books of a local charity.
There is a problem that parallels the well-known vulnerability of the buysell agreement: namely, a wealthy party initiating the process might set the
buy-sell price above the other's financial resources but below fair market
value. In our model, the danger remains that a court would accept more high
bids from wealthy offenders than low bids from low or middle class offenders.
Here, almost certainly, the judge is seeking to maximize other goals besides
equality. Thus, a high bid is attractive because it can fund a victim
compensation program, even though the court recognizes that the bid is
below the level at which the monetary penalty is equivalent to incarceration.
Two answers to this problem are possible. First, the sentencing court could
be instructed to utilize incarceration in a specified percentage of the cases for
each crime category. The most practical route to this end probably would be
presumptive sentencing guidelines issued by a sentencing commission. 99 The
percentage so specified could be low (hypothetically: 25%), and it need not be
rigorously enforced since its real purpose is to start a bidding contest. The net
effect would be free market economics with a vengeance: offenders in the
same crime category would have to frame their bids not only to offer enough
to gain the court's favor, but also with an eye to what other similarly situated
offenders were likely to be offering. All offenders would be motivated by the
knowledge that a specified percentage would probably receive incarceration.
In sum, competition among similar offenders in the resulting auction market
would enforce the monetary equivalence concept. 00
98. The oath requirement allows enhancement of the penalty if a misstatement is made, and reduces the
incentive to mislead. Under United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), a court may increase a sentence
within statutory limits if it believes the defendant has perjured himself, even though no adjudication of the
claimed perjury has occurred.
99. For a discussion of the sentencing commission concept, see ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra

note 13, at STANDARDS 18-3.1-3.5.
100. Of course, some objections to this proposal are obvious. The individual sentencing court never
knows how many defendants in a particular crime category will appear before it when it sentences the first
one. Thus, how can it implement a 25% incarceration guideline? Although some convoluted technical
arrangements could solve this problem, the real answer is that perfect compliance with the guideline is not
necessary in order to achieve the desired result. Offenders neither have perfect information nor, once before
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An important element in this model is the limiting of competitive bidding
to a generic crime category. Offenders within a crime category tend to have
socioeconomic similarities because crime categories are, themselves, class and
income linked (e.g. , poor offenders seldom have the opportunity to violate the
antitrust or securities laws). As a result, a guideline specifying that incarceration be used in a specific percentage of the cases within a given crime category
does not carry with it the danger inherent in other forms of guidelines:
namely, that socioeconomic differences will underlie differences in sentencing
dispositions. Moreover, a guideline which recommends incarceration for a
given percentage of offenders also implies that a reciprocal percentage should
not receive incarceration: a 25% target figure for auto theft (a blue-collar
crime) would mean that 75% of such offenders should not receive incarceration. This approach, therefore, can enable us to reduce, rather than raise, the
total use of incarceration and to allocate its use more equitably. Morally
relevant factors would still carry weight. Because the court would not be
required to accept the highest bid, judges, being human, would still continue
to predictably respond to morally aggravating and mitigating factors.
A second possible variation to reduce discrimination would be to permit
the court to accept the monetary offer on a proportionate basis; that is, the
court could remit half the period of incarceration by accepting half the fine. If
the marginal utility of incarceration truly declines, this suggestion is mildly
unfair to the offender (who theoretically would not have offered one half the
fine to gain remission of one half the sentence). Nevertheless, giving the
offender a "taste of jail" increases the perceived equity of the system and
reduces demoralization costs.
To summarize, there are several advantages to the approach just outlined.
Competitive bidding among offenders: (1) in theory, produces an arbitragelike effect which reduces the disparity among different forms of sanctions and
hence reduces discrimination against the poor (who can also bid on an
installment basis or offer non-monetary consideration); (2) simplifies appellate review because an offender can hardly claim that a fine is excessive after
he, himself, has equated it with the guideline sentence; (3) reduces the use of
incarceration without institutionalizing inequality; (4) minimizes transaction
costs and avoids the delay that would result if the court were seriously to
examine the present and likely future financial status of each offender; and (5)
increases the court's ability to offer restitution to the victims (at least over a
system that uses fixed fine schedules but provides no incentive to the
defendant to offer a substantial fine).
Panaceas are rare, however, and the dangers that lurk in this proposal
remain serious. First, if courts always opted for a fine over a prison term in
the case of wealthy defendants (or always remitted the same portion of the
sentence in favor of a fine), defense counsel would quickly learn to advise their
clients to scale down their proposed fines. The only answer to this problem is
a prosecutorial right to appeal the sentence. Such a power is largely without
precedent and raises a constitutional issue concerning the Double Jeopardy
the sentencing court, are they likely to discount the possibility of an exemplary severe sentence. As long as
prosecutorial appeal is available to hold accountable the court that never imposes incarceration, it is not a
serious problem that a lower percentage than that specified in the hypothetical guideline are incarcerated.
Indeed, the guideline can be drafted to anticipate noncompliance ( e.g., 50% can be specified in order to
achieve a 25% incarceration rate).
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Clause.' 0 1 However, the concept of a prosecutorial appeal has the endorsement of both the ABA 102 and the United States Senate. 103 In addition,
various routes exist by which a carefully drawn statute authorizing prosecutorial appeal of the sentence can outflank the constitutional obstacle.104 On
policy grounds, such a prosecutorial power seems an essential linchpin of
sentencing equality without which a number of persistent problems cannot be
resolved.
The second danger in the procedure just outlined is that some courts might
use the bidding mechanism as a means of extorting huge fines from wealthy
offenders who were convicted of minor offenses. Here, the answer is easier:
under a system of presumptive sentencing guidelines, the court would be
constrained in the period of imprisonment it could threaten. Thus, the court
would not be able to use the threat of a ten-year sentence to coerce the
"voluntary" offer of an excessive fine. A third danger lies in the problem that
the fine will be "passed on" to the organization. Here, the necessary safeguard
is greater use of disqualification from organizational office as a probation
condition.
Before leaving this topic, it is necessary to take a more serious look at the
issue of inequality. Under the proposed system, it is expected that some
offenders in every crime category will receive some imprisonment, while
others similarly situated will pay a fine. In theory, this is not unfair because
the offenders themselves have equalized the two sentencing alternatives and
are indifferent between them. In reality, however, even if the disparity
between different forms of sanctions is thus minimized, one still suspects that
those imprisoned will believe themselves the losers in a judicial lottery. Is this
actually a scapegoat system in which the lottery's losers bear the social costs
of deterrence while others equally blameworthy escape? To answer this
question it is useful to distinguish two different kinds of inequality: random
and institutional. If the latter (structural) form of inequality is believed to be
worse than the former, then this lottery aspect is more a virtue than a vice.
101. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979) (to subject a defendant to the risk of an
enhanced sentence which he had not appealed, and which he had already started to serve, violates the
guarantee against double jeopardy), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. February 19, 1980).
102. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, STANDARD 20-1.1 (Approved Draft, 1978);
ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS supra note 13 at STANDARD 18-4.9(b).
103. S. 1722, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3725(b) (1979) (authorizing prosecutorial appeal when approved by
Attorney General or his designee; has already been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee). S. 1437,
§ 3725(b) (the identical provision) was passed in the Senate during the 90th Congress. Statutes in several
states permit prosecutorial appeals when the defendant appeals. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 214144 (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28 A-C (Michie Law Co-op Supp. 1979); cf Walsh v.
Picard, 446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971) (constitutionally permissible to condition the grant of defendant's
right to appeal appropriateness of sentence on state's right to cross appeal).
104. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S.
February 19, 1980) seems to recognize that a carefully drafted statute may avoid the double jeopardy issue
by provisionally imposing the statutory maximum sentence, on a tentative basis, until appellate review of
the intended sentence is completed. The sentence then can be revised downward to that determined by the
appellate court on the prosecutor's appeal. This approach is now used with respect to commitments for
observation pending sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205(c) (1976). Another alternative might be to allow the
convicted organizational offender to wait until a prosecutorial appeal is filed and an appellate decision
rendered before beginning his sentence. Since the defendant has not begun to serve his sentence, an increase
in that sentence might not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969) (rejecting the contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the imposition of a harsher
sentence following a retrial).

454

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:419

Using the lottery, the selection process is far less predictable than the present
system, in which wealthy defendants generally receive non-incarcerative
05
alternatives and the poor (and minorities) get sent to prison.
Indeed, the proposed structure can be defended from both an economic
and a jurisprudential perspective. Economists frequently draw a distinction
between "ex post" and "ex ante" equality. 0 6 A lottery, for example, is not
unfair simply because the winner is treated differently from the losers. As
long as the odds are the same for all, the lottery is fair because it is equal on an
"ex ante" basis (although by definition it produces "ex post" inequalities). A
sentencing system that systematically sends the poor to prison and the rich to
community service is, however, an example of "ex ante" inequality and can be
condemned as unfair. But a sentencing procedure which advocates that the
same percentage of antitrust and an equally serious "blue-collar" crime
offenders be imprisoned restores the criminal justice system to "ex ante"
equality. That the system may produce "ex post" inequalities between
different antitrust violators of equal culpability is a less serious deficiency
because such risks were
assumed when one chose to enter the lottery by
1 07
committing the crime.
From a jurisprudential perspective, it is of course possible to object to any
system of justice that utilizes anything approaching a scapegoat. No doubt
both Kant and his contemporary descendants, the "Just Deserts" school,
would be opposed to this approach. 0 8 Realistically, however, any system of
deterrence will produce some scapegoats on whom the social costs of crime
prevention will fall disproportionately. Although this is regrettable, it is, to a
degree, unavoidable. Even if sentencing were an ideally fair process, other
engrained practices, such as plea bargaining, pre-trial diversion, and prosecutorial discretion, would persist in producing an unequal loading of these social
costs on a few. Indeed, the fact of low rates of apprehension implies that a few
are being punished to deter a larger, equally culpable group.
Relatively little can be done about this. 0 9 At a minimum, however,
institutionalized inequities can be eliminated in the selection of those used as
105. The most recent and methodologically sophisticated study of sentencing disparities is M. ZALMAN,
C. OSTROM, P. GUILLIAMS & G. PEASLEE, SENTENCING IN MICHIGAN: REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN
FELONY SENTENCING PROJECT (1979). This study of sentencing practices in Michigan in the 1970's found
racial differences among offenders to have a statistically significant impact on the "in/out" decision (i.e.,
probation versus incarceration), and concluded that "non-whites have a much higher probability of being
incarcerated for crimes with a given seriousness level." Id. at 241. Socioeconomic differences among

offenders were also found to be statistically significant. Id. at 266-67. In particular, poorer defendants who
did not retain private counsel or who were incarcerated prior to trial fared less well. For earlier studies
reaching similar conclusions, see Clarke & Koch, The Influence of Income and Other Factors on Whether
Criminal Defendants Go to Prison, I I LAW & Soc's. REV. 57 (1976); Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and
CriminalSentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint. 8 LAW & SoC'Y. REV. 357, 364-65 (1974);
Hindelang, Equality Under the Law, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 306 (1969).
106. See K.ELZINGA & W.BREIT, supra note I, at 130-31; cf Pauly & Willett, Two Concepts of Equity
and Their Implications for Public Policy, 53 Soc. Sct. Q. 8 (1972).
107. This does not deny that such disparities remain undesirable. The likely effect of the proposed
system, however, would be to reduce such disparities by increasing the amount of the fine paid.
108. See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1076-80; Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination
of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 781 (1976).
109. Of course, one may seek greater proportionality between the crime and the punishment, and
sentencing guidelines probably represent the most effective means to this end. The need for greater
proportionality is accepted not only by the "Just Deserts" theorists, but also by those concerned with the
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scapegoats. If perfect justice is unattainable, at least the allocation of the
necessary imperfections can be random. The key assertion here is that
sentencing equality must be seen as an issue in distributive justice. Allocational fairness should then be evaluated more along class, racial, and
economic lines and less as a matter of the natural law of just deserts."10 In
such a light, it matters less that some white-collar offenders are treated more
severely than others equally culpable than that the system is structurally
biased to predictably administer harsher punishments to the less well-off.
The foregoing model will seem cynical and manipulative to some. Even if
the use of the words "lottery" and "scapegoat" involve a degree of deliberate
overstatement, the idea of a formalized auction in which the amount of the
fine is a factor affecting the resulting sanction will offend many. Predictably,
there will be the rebuttal that non-utilitarian "process values" exist that will
be injured if the defendant is subjected to such pressure. Whatever one thinks
of this rebuttal,"' it is likely to be dispositive for at least the foreseeable
future.
Thus, it is necessary to fall back upon a more practical suggestion. There is
nothing inherently offensive to "process values" in the idea of a guideline that
advises the court to employ non-incarcerative dispositions in approximately
equal percentages for crime categories of equivalent gravity. Essentially, this
is a "macro" guideline intended to structure the exercise of judicial discretion
on a generic rather than a "micro" (or individualized) basis. 1 2 Against this
backdrop, even without the use of any formalized bidding process, the
sentencing court could still permit the defendant to propose sentencing
alternatives; indeed, the offender's common law right to allocute essentially
requires this. Thus, as long as the defendant perceives that he has some
burden to convince the court not to impose incarceration, he has an incentive
to offer an equivalent alternative penalty (in terms of a fine or community
service). Such a system may not be as theoretically neat as an auction market,
but it may be the "second best" alternative which can be achieved. Operationally, sentencing guidelines should not seek to specify monetary equivalents to a sentence of incarceration because any such tariff eliminates the
incentive which uncertainty produces. Rather, the court should be instructed
in general terms that any fine it imposes should be equivalent to the guideline
terms of imprisonment, taking into consideration the unique position of the
individual offender.
In summation, a sentencing system in which alternatives to incarceration
are expected to be employed in a non-trivial percentage of cases for every
crime category, and which gives an incentive to the defendant to propose an
alternative sanction, seems likely (i) to maximize both deterrence and
restitution, (ii) to mitigate judicial nullification and reduce transaction costs,
and (iii) to come as close as possible to equalizing monetary and incarcerative
unequal loading of necessary social costs. Such a principle is integral to Norval Morris's widely acclaimed
model. See N. Morris, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-76(1974).

110. 1 have expounded on this thesis at greater length in Coffee, supra note 56, at 1080-99.
Ill. I do not deny that there are "process values" that have significance independent of the correctness
of the outcome. In this case, however, we are faced with a conflict not between efficiency and the claimed
"process value," but between equality and the asserted injury to the appearance of justice. This is a very
different sort of conflict, in which neither side can clearly claim a moral priority.
112. See Coffee, supra note 56, at 980.
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penalties. This net gain to society, moreover, is achieved at a cost only to
those who are now inadequately deterred.
III.

THE INDIVIDUAL OR THE ORGANIZATION: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE
COSTS?

A distinctive feature of organizational crime is that it is committed by
agents for the primary benefit of a principal. 113 Axiomatically, although the
corporation must act through its agents, the profit accrues primarily to the
firm and its owners. Thus, the cost of deterring the agent may be less than
that of deterring the firm. Not only will the organization incur greater gain
from crime than will its agents, but, if there exists no monetary equivalent to a
harsh prison sentence, then the organization also faces a lesser deterrent
threat.
In terms of a cost-effective strategy, therefore, it seems strange that the
Free Market economists agree that the organization should be the cost bearer.
It may be revealing that they give substantially different reasons why this
should be so. Elzinga and Breit use as their starting point the persistent
unwillingness of the federal courts to impose imprisonment on antitrust
violators, even in blatant cases of price fixing. They noted that, as of 1976, no
such organizational offender appeared to have ever served as much as a year
in prison."t 4 This pattern has continued even though the Antitrust Division
now regularly submits a sentencing memorandum recommending imprisonment.115 They attribute this phenomenon to the court's lack of confidence that
it has the truly culpable official before it; perhaps, they suggest, the court fears
that a subordinate official is "taking the rap" for those higher up. 116
Here, Elzinga and Breit appear to have overstated their case. Judicial
doubts about the true locus of the criminal decision within the organization
may play a role in sentencing patterns, but probably not a decisive one. Not
only does the experience of Watergate suggest that subordinates do "spill the
beans" when facing imprisonment, but judges frequently articulate a variety
17
of plausible reasons to explain their reluctance to imprison executives.
First, judges are understandably concerned about the health and safety of
the defendant. To commit middle-aged and physically weak offenders to a
closed society in which they are likely to be at the mercy of others who are
younger, stronger, and violence-prone is not self-evidently to treat them
"equally." It is a strange notion of equality that requires the lion and the lamb
113. For a fuller treatment of this point, see Banfield, Corruption As A Feature of Governmental
Organization, IS J. L. & ECON. 587 (1975).
114. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 30-38.
115. Despite such memoranda (see note 42 supra), largely non-incarcerative sentences continue to be
meted out in antitrust cases. See, e.g.. United States v. Alton Box Board Co., [1977-1] TRADE CASES
(CCH) T 61,336 (N.D. III. 1977). See also Renfrew, The PaperLabel Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE.
L.J. 590 (1977).
116. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 38-40.
117. For one judge's detailed statements of the agonizing difficulties he faced when the defendant was a
respectable and indeed honorable member of the community, see Renfrew, supra note 115. See also United
States v. Alton Box Board Co., [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 61,336 at 71,169 (N.D. II1. 1977) ("The
defendant will have to serve the sentence, but it is the judge's conscience that will have to carry it long after
it has been served").
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to be placed in the same cage. Second, the sentiment exists (however
debatable it may be) that the "white-collar" offender has already suffered
enough, to a degree not matched by other defendants, because of the greater
stigmatization and loss of status incident to his conviction. 118 Third, little
consensus exists among119judges (or anyone else) on the relative gravity of
"white-collar" crimes.
Finally, judges inevitably may sympathize with
120
those whose background and community position match their own.
None of these justifications, however, necessarily leads to the conclusion
that it is unfair to punish any party other than the firm. In addition, there is
some evidence that courts have resisted heavy penalties in the case of the
corporate defendant as much as they have resisted the use of incarceration in
the case of the individual defendant: 12' the typical fine imposed on corporations for antitrust violations, for example, has been ludicrously low. 122 Thus,
the factor of judicial nullification emphasized by Elzinga and Breit cuts both
ways.
Professor Posner, using a more traditional economic analysis, argues that
because the firm is the decision-maker, it is the firm's utility function, not the
118. Not all judges, however, adhere to the notion that stigmatization should be considered in
sentencing. In United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), Judge Marvin Frankel
imposed a prison term upon an elderly rabbi convicted of fraud. The court discounted the defendant's plea
for leniency which was, in part, based on his public humiliation:
Defendant's notoriety should not in the last analysis serve to lighten, any more than it may be
permitted to aggravate, his sentence. The fact that he has been pilloried by journalists is
essentially a consequence of the prestige and priveleges he enjoyed before he was exposed as a
wrongdoer. The long fall from grace was possible only because of the height he had reached.
The suffering from loss of public esteem reflects a body of opinion that the esteem had been, in
at least some measure, wrongly bestowed and enjoyed. It is not possible to justify the notion
that this mode of nonjudicial punishment should be an occasion for leniency not given to a
defendant who never basked in such an admiring light at all. The quest for both the
appearance and the substance of equal justice prompts the court to discount the thought that
the public humiliation serves the function of imprisonment.
119. For the results of a questionnaire asking business, civic, and educational groups to compare the
gravity of antitrust violations to other crimes, see Renfrew, supra note 115, at 600-02. Respondents were
members of groups who had listened to speeches as part of their punishment. Id. at 595. Responses were
received from 99 of approximately 2700 audience members. Id. Not surprisingly, the respondents found no
white-collar crime as heinous as bank robbery. Id. at 601. Although virtually all (95 of 99) of the
respondents felt that antitrust violations were serious or moderately serious offenses, id. at 600, and 62%
agreed that "antitrust violators deserve imprisonment," id. at 601, nearly half (43%) felt that prison
sentences were only appropriate for "deliberate serious violations." Id. at 601 n.21.
120. See Baker & Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critique, 86 YALE L.J. 619 (1977) (criticizing
judges' actions in sentencing white-collar criminals). The authors caution judges to avoid making "ad
hominem distinctions that should be alien to a government of laws and not of men." Id. at 621.
121. In probably the most famous price-fixing case, the electrical equipment case of the 1950's, the
average fine imposed on each corporate defendant was only $16,550. General Electric was convicted on
nineteen counts and paid a fine of $437,500 which was 0.001% of the company's total profit and less than
0.003% of its net profit for a single year. The maximum fine was imposed in only one case. See K. ELZINGA
& W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 56-57.
122. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970). In the period
from 1965 to 1969, fines were imposed in 46 criminal cases, with an average fine of $116,622. Id. at 392.
Only one of those cases resulted in a prison sentence (one to sixty days). Id. at 391. Interestingly, the
Department of Justice in recent years has itself recommended the maximum fine only in a minority of cases
(27% of the cases between 1967 and 1970), and in 1973 testified in favor of a lower maximum fine than was
finally enacted by Congress. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT supra note 1, at 61.

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:419

individual's, that should be altered. 123 From this perspective, the individual is
little more than an anonymous cog within the firm, and if he misbehaves in a
manner adverse to the firm, the firm will discipline or fire him. 124
There are several counter-arguments to this analysis. First, as already
noted, it may be less expensive to punish the individual rather than the
organization, because the individual's expected benefit is lower. Second,
because the corporation is better positioned than the individual to pass along
5
the cost in the form of higher prices, it will be less deterred. 12
Attempts by the
state to impose higher penalties against the corporation may also require
higher transaction costs, because the corporate defendant may be expected to
expend more resources resisting conviction. In contrast, the transaction costs
associated with mounting a legal defense are far more significant to the
individual defendant, who accordingly has a greater incentive to plea-bargain.
Thus, it may be more cost efficient to focus on the individual decision-maker.
Third, there is little evidence that fines in fact trigger any internal
disciplinary mechanism within the firm, even if they should do so in theory.
In the electrical equipment price fixing conspiracy of the late 1950's, the
convicted defendants were eventually obliged to settle civil actions by paying
approximately $600 million to the private plaintiffs. 126 Despite criminal trials,
congressional investigations, derivative suits, and research by a legion of
journalists, no credible evidence was uncovered linking senior executives of
any of the major corporations to the conspiracy. 27 On the contrary, the
participants were basically middle level managers who hid their involvement
from their superiors. According to Professor Posner's theory, the organization is expected in such a situation to discipline the individuals who have
exposed it to such an extraordinary loss by firing them. 28 Rarely would there
have been greater justification for such an action.
But what in fact happened? Westinghouse "imposed absolutely no disciplinary treatment upon the individuals responsible."'' 29 General Electric demoted some and asked for the resignation of others, but retained still others who
had been convicted. 130 The other corporate conspirators appear to have taken
no punitive action against any employees. 13' Even those fired by General
123. R. POSNER, supra note I, at 235-36. See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST supra note 6 at 225-26,
comparing the effectiveness of fines and imprisonment with the natural sanctions of the marketplace.
124. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 225-28.
125. This assertion, of course, assumes that the level of competition in the product market is less than
perfect. Admittedly, if competition were perfect, fines could not be passed on in the form of higher prices,
but even in this context the effect of the fine might still be passed on in part to the firm's workers (in the
form of greater resistance to demands for wage increases).
126. Wheeler, supra note 80, at 1335 n.78.
127. See Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive (pts. 1-2), 47 VA.L. REV. 929, 48 VA. L. REV.

1, 15-18 (1961-62). Some 29 corporations and 44 individuals were indicted. 47 VA. L. REV. at 929 n.l; 48
VA. L. REV. at 47.
128. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 226.
129. Wheeler, supra note 80, at 1336 (citing C. WALTON & F. CLEVELAND, CORPORATIONS ON TRIAL:
THE ELECTRIC CASES, 103 (1964)).
130. J. HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY 223 (1962). Those retained appear to have been no

less culpable than those dismissed. They had, however, according to one account, previously been seen as
"comers" within the corporation. See R.A. SMITH, CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS 121, 124 (1963). Such
selective use of internal discipline may undercut its deterrent effect on other employees; in this instance, it
apparently caused "widespread resentment" within General Electric. Id. at 124.
131. J. HERLING, supra note 130, at 311.
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Electric were able to find similar positions in other firms. 132 Thus, even in the
case when the organization has disciplined the employee, there is reason to
doubt that he has suffered a sufficiently significant penalty to deter others
from engaging in future frolics and detours. In overview, the loyalty shown by
the corporations involved in the electrical equipment conspiracy to their
convicted employees was remarkable: most were retained even in the face of
derivative suits against their corporation's directors for negligent supervision, 133 and shareholder proxy proposals seeking their dismissal were soundly
defeated. 34 Those convicted generally were seen as unfortunate scapegoats
who merited special treatment by their companies-in effect, corporate
prisoners of war.13
This same pattern is reflected in the experience of corporations convicted of
offenses growing out of the Watergate investigation. A follow-up survey in
1975 by the New York Times found that "most of the 21 business executives
who admitted their136guilt" to the Special Prosecutor were "still presiding over
these companies."
The economist can attempt to account for this pattern by arguing that the
illegal behavior was in the best interests of the corporation (or at least
appeared to be at the time) and thus did not warrant disciplinary action. In
some cases this may be true, but it fails to give a persuasive explanation for the
foregoing cases. Antitrust violations, because of the potential treble damages
liability, cannot safely be assumed to maximize the utility of the corporation
as a whole, although they may well advance the interests of a particular
division or group of employees by freeing them from the anxieties of interfirm competition. Similarly, the political contributions prosecuted in the wake
of Watergate may have been motivated as much by the interests or political
sympathies of the chief executive as by any specific corporate benefit sought.
If the corporation was not benefitted by the criminal acts of its officials,
however, what explains the general absence in these cases of disciplinary
action against the convicted employees? A multitude of explanations, of
course, are possible. In some cases, the organization may fear that the
dismissed employees may "blow the whistle" and implicate it in an even more
far-reaching conspiracy. 137 In other cases, a combination of sympathy and
vicarious identifications ("There-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I") may motivate superiors not to dismiss the errant employee. The corporation may feel
that "over-deterrence" is a greater danger than "under-deterrence," because
in the future it may want its employees to act in the gray areas of the law.
More generally, there is the possibility that senior management is so well132. Id. at 259.
133. See, e.g.. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Dei.Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963); Smiles v. Elfred,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), discussed in Note, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 175 (1964).
134. See J. HERLING, supra note 130, at 257-84.

135. Id. at 310-11.
136. Jensen, Watergate Donors Still Riding High, N.Y Times, August 24, 1975; cf Nathan, supra note
81, at 30-35.
137. This is an entirely rational fear, underscored by the recent experience of Gulf and Western
Industries. That firm fired a felonious executive who had embezzled $2.4 million from the corporation,
only to have him "blow the whistle" on unrelated corporate activities to the SEC in order to secure plea
bargaining concessions. Dorfman, Justice Thwarted: The $2.4 Million Tipster, NEW YORK MAGAZINE,
Feb. 13, 1979. The executive, former Gulf and Western General Counsel Joel Dolkart, eventually received
a sentence of probation after having been originally sentenced to a term of three years.
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entrenched that it does not fear removal attempts by widely scattered and
unorganized stockholders. Whatever the reasons, the ultimate conclusion is
that evidence of internal disciplinary measures is conspicuous by its absence.
Thus, exclusive reliance on penalties aimed at the firm seems dangerously
unrealistic.
This last observation, that stockholders may be powerless to remove
management even if there is conclusive evidence of wrongdoing, leads to a
more generalized problem which criminal justice policy must confront. A
significant number of economists no longer accept two of the fundamental
assumptions of the neoclassical school: (1) that the individual decisionmaker will predictably act in the interest of the firm; and (2) that the firm will
seek to maximize profits (and thus will respond quickly to increased penalties
that make illegal activity too costly to be profitable). Rather, these economists
stress the relative autonomy and opportunities for discretionary decisionmaking possessed by the individual manager within the firm. This
school-whose members might be called "the managerialists"-includes
Nobel Prize Winner Herbert Simon, John Kenneth Galbraith, William
Baumol, Robin Marris, and Oliver Williamson. 138 Their work overlaps with
that of an even larger school of organization theorists.139 Some (Galbraith and
Baumol, in particular) argue that managers in the modern corporation act
principally to maximize the firm's gross assets and increase sheer size-in
effect, an Empire Building Model. 140 Others, such as Williamson, advance the
less sweeping theory that, in the decentralized, multi-divisional firm, each
division pursues its own sub-goals without substantial regard for the interests
of the firm as a whole. Such "sub-goal pursuit" may lead the manager of a
division to take legal risks (e.g., improper payments, pollution, the conceal141
ment of safety defects) which are not in the interest of the firm as a whole.
In short, what is good for General Motors may not be good for its Vice
President in charge of the Oldsmobile division.
Concededly, neoclassical economists have never accepted the managerialists' argument that the lack of congruence between the motives of the
manager and his organization may cause the manager to act in a manner that
is in fact adverse to the corporation's interests. Their answer has been that the
disciplining force of the market will prevent the manager from engaging for
long in discretionary behavior contrary to the corporation's interests. If
persistent, such frolics and detours away from the central goal of profit
maximization will attract a hostile take-over by another firm, which realizes
that it can obtain 42a "bigger bang for the buck" from the assets of the
mismanaged firm.1
138. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (rev. ed. 1967); J. K.
GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); J.MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); R.
MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (1964); THE CORPORATE SOCIETY (R.
Marris ed. 1974); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1970); 0.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A
THEORY OF THE FIRM (1967).
139. For an overview of the organization theorists, see MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY (M. Haire
ed. 1959); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and
an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
140. For a succinct exposition of this position, see Marris, Galbraith, Solow and the Truth About
Corporations, 11 PUB. INTEREST 37 (1968).

141. See Coffee, supra note 139, at 1134-37.
142. For the classic statement of this assertion that inefficiency will result in the ouster of management
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Although this theory sounds logical, the disciplinary powers of the market
have eroded. A combination of developments-state anti-takeover laws, high
transaction costs, increasingly restrictive judicial interpretations of the federal
securities laws applicable to tender offers-has diluted the incentive for the
tenderor and raised the odds against a hostile tender. 143 Empirical studies
corroborate this picture of a management not fully accountable to its
shareholders by showing, for example, that the compensation of corporate
executives is lower in those firms that are "owner controlled" than in those
that are "manager controlled."'144 Even if the disciplinary powers of the
capital markets were considerably greater, they would be unlikely to have a
significant impact upon managerial behavior in this context. By becoming
involved in a protracted criminal episode, the would-be target corporation in
effect renders itself the monarch butterfly of the corporate world, which none
can swallow without experiencing acute indigestion. Paradoxically, the
resulting stigma and legal controversy that attach to some companies (such as
Lockheed) probably insulate them from hostile attack by tenderors who hope
to make a quick turnaround.
The key implication to be drawn from the managerialists' position is that a
penalty structure that is high enough to deter the corporation may still not
deter its managers (who may be intent on maximizing a quite different utility
function). For example, under the foregoing Empire Building Model, a fine is
the less effective sanction because it reduces only net income, not the gross
income or sales figure the manager is seeking to maximize. Even under a less
ambitious model, the corporate official may be more intent than is the
corporation on maximizing profits within a shorter time period. 145 Such a
motivation would be rational if the manager's compensation, fringe benefits,
and opportunities for promotion were tied to short-run performance or if he
foresaw a hostile take-over which could be averted by an increase in short-run
profitability. To a considerable degree, this seems inevitable because, to
paraphrase Lord Keynes, in the long run the manager, unlike the corporation,
is dead.
Still another reason for focusing on the individual decision-maker is that
there sometimes may exist a need for incapacitation as well as deterrence. 46
through some form of a take over, see Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965); see also R. POSNER, supra note 1,at 303-05.
143. Even before the recent proliferation of state anti-takeover statutes, a 1967 empirical survey found
"only 29 successful takeovers during the past 10 years out of 83 contested bids." Hayes & Taussig, Tactics
of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135, 137 (1967). For a list of 37 unsuccessful tender offers
between 1974 and June 1979, see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW 101, 13234 (1979). Since this article is not focused on the tender offer, I will not belabor the reader with other
citations, but the transaction costs associated with a litigated hostile take over have, in at least some cases,
exceeded four million dollars.
144. This literature is discussed in R. BLAIR, supra note 2, at 12-16; see, especially, Palmer, The ProfitPerformance Effects of the Separation of Ownership from Control in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations, 4
BELL J. ECON. & MGNT. Sci. 2193 (1973); Stano, Monopoly Power, Ownership Control and Corporate
Performance, 7 BELL J. ECON. 672 (1976). See also W. McEACIERN, CONTROL, COMPENSATION AND
PERFORMANCE IN THE LARGE CORPORATION (1975), which argues that in markets characterized by weak
competition firms dominated by a clear ownership bloc appear to be more profitable than firms with
diffused ownership.
145. See Coffee, supra note 139, at 1105 & n.13.
146. Those familiar with the career of Cortes W. Randell, the former President of National Student
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Even if we assume that the corporation does seek to maximize profits (rather
than sales or assets), it may still respond sluggishly to increases in the penalty
structure. This is particularly true if one must rely on a hostile take-over as
the disciplining mechanism. Indeed, a hostile take-over may not even be
possible in a firm managed by a majority shareholder. In any event, during
this interval between the short-run and the long-run which economists tend to
ignore, society's interests may not be adequately protected-particularly if
the culpable manager is not risk averse, or if he underestimates the risk of
apprehension.
In the growing number of cases in which health or safety dangers are
created by corporate misconduct, the danger of a sluggish response to an
increase in the legal threat requires supplementary remedies. Here, the most
direct incapacitory remedies are either disqualification from corporate office,
incarceration, or some combination of the two.
The arguments advanced in this section should not, however, be overread.
There are sometimes legitimate reasons for directing our principal deterrent
efforts at the corporation rather than the manager. For example, in the case of
health and safety statutes which impose vicarious criminal liability on
corporate officers for negligent acts or omissions, the odds are high that any
campaign to invoke these laws will be substantially offset by judicial
nullification when sentencing judges confront "flesh and blood" defendants
having impeccable backgrounds, communityties, and tearful families. 147 Here,
Elzinga and Breit's observation of the difficulties of pinpointing the truly
culpable official has special merit. 48 Further, because these crimes are
capable of concealment for considerable periods, there is the additional
danger that the true individual culprit may have long since left the scene, even
if he can be identified.
It may also be more cost efficient to focus on the corporation in this
context. Because the corporation will probably face very heavy civil liability
in these instances (witness for instance Allied Chemical's disastrous experience with kepone or Hooker Chemical's nightmare with the Love Canal), the
earlier observation that it is easier to deter the individual actor within the
corporation no longer applies to the same degree. Both the corporation and
the individual probably face potential losses well in excess of likely gains (in
the case of the corporation because there is an overlap of civil and criminal
liability; in the case of the individual because relatively little of the gain from
corporate crime accrues to him). Although they are similarly situated in this
respect, however, only the individual, whose fixed costs and declining
marginal utility should make him a "risk preferrer," faces possible imprisonMarketing Corporation, will understand this immediately. After serving a prison term in connection with
fraudulent activities leading to the demise of National Student Marketing, Mr. Randell formed and
defrauded a real estate corporation, for which he was sentenced in 1979 to a seven-year term. Similarly, one
would not want the President of Equity Funding to be able to pay a fine and again have the opportunity to
obtain control of investors' funds. The need for incapacitation does not lead automatically, however, to the
imposition of incarceration; probation conditions can be imposed, disqualifying the official from corporate
office or from participating in certain forms of business. See, e.g., Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221
(D.D.C. 1974).
147. Such a campaign to impose vicarious criminal liability on supervisors and corporate management
appears nonetheless to be coming. See. An OSHA Crackdown on Job-Related Deaths, BUSINESS WEEK,
Aug. 20, 1979, at 25.
148. See K. ELZINGA &W. BREIT, supra note I. at 38-40; see also text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
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ment. In contrast, the corporation is faced with only a monetary loss and, as a
probable "risk averter," should be more ready to plea-bargain. This would be
particularly true if the firm can secure a plea of nolo contendere as the price of
its plea bargain, in order to improve its opportunities for a favorable
settlement with respect to its civil liability. 149 If the corporation is thus willing
to settle while the individual believes it necessary to fight, it seems more
economical in terms of transaction costs for health and safety law enforcement authorities to prosecute the corporation, with whom they can negotiate,
rather than take an "all or nothing" gamble on convicting the individual. 50
This conclusion that where penalties are high individuals will fight while
firms will settle would appear to have general applicability and point to the
routine prosecution of the firm on the grounds that it will offer less resistance.
Nevertheless, outside the context of health and safety violations, in which the
use of vicarious criminal liability will generate judicial sympathy for the
defendant and the corporation already faces staggering civil liability, other
factors should outweigh this consideration. The greater impact on the
individual of the cost of mounting a legal defense, the greater deterrent threat
in the incarcerative sentencing range, and the lesser payoff to him from
organizational crime make it at least as likely that a strategy aimed at the
individual will yield greater returns. Nor is it necessary to choose between
these two strategies as if they were mutually exclusive. To rebut the Free
Market Model, it is not necessary to prove the opposite of its contention that
the firm should be the target of criminal law enforcement. From the
prosecutor's perspective, there often will be obvious economies of scale in
prosecuting both the individual and the corporation at the same trial.
One final reason exists for an enforcement strategy aimed at the corporation rather than the individual. It may be possible to "rehabilitate" the
organization-or at least incapacitate it-in ways not achievable by a strategy
aimed only at the individual decision-maker. For example, the ABA Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures now give a qualified
endorsement to the imposition of preventive restraints and a period of judicial
oversight when a corporation is convicted.' 15 In varying ways, both the
pending Senate and House bills to recodify the federal criminal code
effectively authorize the sentencing court to impose a term of probation upon

149. After a plea of nolo contendere is accepted by the court, the criminal conviction does not
collaterally estop the defendant from denying liability in subsequent civil litigation involving the same
issues. The ABA Standards on Pleas of Guilty, however, now recommend that the court consider the
interests of victims (who will be seeking compensation) before accepting such a plea. ABA ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 18-

.l(b) (1967). Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b), the court must consider the views of the prosecutor before
accepting a nolo plea. The policy of the Department of Justice in recent years has been to oppose such pleas.
150. The policy only makes sense if the state can obtain a significant quid pro quo in return for accepting
a nolo contendere plea. Otherwise, the corporation may have been convicted but remain undeterred. Cf
Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976) (companion civil case to criminal case in which federal
prosecution negotiated plea of nolo contendere in exchange for restitution by defendant to civil plaintiffs).
It is uniquely in the health and safety context, however, that it is most in the state's interest to grant some
concessions (either in determining the fine or accepting the plea of nolo) in return for preventive conditions
of corporate probation designed to ensure that the violations will not recur.
151. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, at Standard 18-2.8 (recognizing need for "judicial

oversight" of a corporation guilty of repetitive criminal misconduct or whose conduct creates a "clear and
present danger to the public health or safety").
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5 2 Even without this authority, some judges have already
the corporation.
153

done so.

What can be achieved through a sanction of corporate probation? If one
accepts the position of the managerialists that corporate officials have a
degree of discretion neither fully disciplined by the market nor exclusively
focused on profit maximization, then society can never be assured that
corporate misconduct will be deterred by penalties that make it in the
corporation's interest to obey the law. 54 If deterrence fails, society must then
turn to incapacitation. Here, this chiefly means the imposition of auditing and
monitoring controls designed to detect and prevent repetition of the misconduct. The exact nature of these controls will vary with the species of crime to
be prevented, but examples can easily be obtained from recent SEC consent
orders.'15 Even more ambitious conditions of probation can be designed in
order to achieve greater congruence between the aims of the managers and
those of the organization. 51 6 It is not necessary to explore here the full scope of
152. The Senate bill authorizes a sentence of probation for an organization. S. 1722, § 2001(c), 96th
Cong.. 1st Sess. The House bill authorizes a sentence of "conditional discharge" for an organization under
reasonable conditions analogous to those imposed on probationers. H.R. 6233, § 3301.
153. See, e.g., United States v. J.C. Ehrlich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1974); cf. United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing specific conditions of probation imposed by
lower court as unreasonable, but generally upholding court's power to place a corporation on probation).
Also see "Judge in Arms Case Orders Olin to Pay $510,000 In Charity," N.Y. Times, March 31, 1978, § D
(Business), at 1. The present legal authority of a federal court to place an unwilling corporation on
probation is beyond the scope of this article.
154. Thus, Professor Wheeler concludes simply that the corporation cannot be deterred, and that we
must therefore focus on the individual decision-maker. Wheeler, supra note 80, at 1334-37.
155. For a review of recent consent orders, see Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary
Relief in SEC Level Injunction Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323, 1333-34, 1338 (1976); Herlihy & Levine,
Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 L. & Pot Y INT'L Bus. 547 (1976); Note, The Securities
and Exchange Commission: An Introduction to the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Law, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 121, 124 n.18 (1979). Among the preventive controls required have been: the adoption of
Audit Committees, the use of special counsel to conduct internal investigations, the creation of a
permanent staff for the board of directors, and the implementation of new accounting controls.
The recent experience of the Allied Chemical Company provides a paradigm ot the possible
achievements of this remedy. Following its disastrous involvement with the dumping of Kepone into the
James River, Allied Chemical entered into a consent order with the SEC under which an "independent
investigation of material environmental risk areas and material environmental uncertainties in connection
with its business" was to be conducted and appropriate action taken in light thereof. SEC v. Allied Chem.
Corp., C.A. No. 77-0373 (D.D.C. 1977), discussed in Coffee, supra note 139, at 1271-72. Subsequently,
Allied established a Toxic Risk Assessment Committee to review all internal information on possible safety
hazards. The Environmental Protection Agency has recommended this structure as a model for other
companies. See Hayes, "Complying with E.P.A. Rules." N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1980, § D (Business), at 1,
col. 4. The SEC's jurisdiction is limited, however, and, in principle, there is no reason why remedies
available to a civil court should be denied to a criminal court where the defendant has been found guilty
under an even higher burden of proof. Exactly these monitoring remedies should be available to the
sentencing court in any of the score of recent instances in which toxic chemicals or dangerous drugs appear
to have been knowingly released. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
156. Harvard Business School Professor Joseph Bower gives the following example of a typical
incongruence between the aims of managers and those of the organization: clean air may be a worthy
corporate objective, but plant managers will not pursue it unless they are forgiven the higher costs
involved. Bower, On the Amoral Organization. in THE CORPORATE SOCIETY 178, 197 (R. Marris ed. 1974).
Assuming that a corporation has been convicted of a criminal violation involving air pollution, a more
ambitious definition of the scope of a corporate probation sanction would require a revision in the structure
of the corporation's incentive system, thus requiring that managers be rewarded for reducing pollution as
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this remedy to see that there may be powerful arguments for prosecuting the
corporation that do not depend at all on whether corporations can be

deterred.
IV. THE CERTAINTY/SEVERITY TRADEOFF: WHY THE FORMER
OUTWEIGHS THE LATTER IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL CRIME CONTEXT
The final element of the Free Market Model is the assertion that an optimal
strategy for law enforcement would combine very high penalties with very
low enforcement expenditures. Underlying this analysis is the assumption
that a 100% probability of a one-year sentence produces the same result as a
10% probability of a ten-year sentence. 57 If so, it would follow that society
achieves more deterrence for the dollar by investing in high penalties rather
than in high enforcement, because it costs more to hire police and prosecutors
to raise the odds of conviction than it does to imprison longer those who have
been convicted.
This reasoning, however, ignores two arguments that have already been
discussed: (1) that the marginal utility of incarceration declines; 58 and (2)
that the utility of fines is limited by the collectability boundary. 159 Thus, a tenyear sentence does not have ten times the deterrent value as does a one-year
sentence because the costs of incarceration are "front loaded."160 Similarly, a
high fine is subject to evasion and reduction.
A predictable response to these objections is that one may still compensate
for them more cheaply than one can raise the risk of apprehension by simply
increasing the length of the sentence to offset the declining marginal utility of
incarceration. Arguably, the costs of incarceration are at least an order of
magnitude lower than those of raising the apprehension rate. If so, one could
propose mandatory fifteen- or twenty-year sentences if a ten-year sentence is
not viewed as proportionally more severe than a one-year sentence.
A variety of practical and even constitutional objections may be made to
this argument for longer sentences. First, empirical studies suggest that
neither judges nor prosecutors will enforce penalties considered unduly
harsh. 161 Attempts to abolish their discretion in order to force them to impose
well as for increasing profits. The fundamental aim of such a probation condition would be to align the
manager's self-interest with the corporate obedience to the law.
Interestingly, Allied Chemical's internal toxic safety monitoring system is undergirded by an incentive
compensation plan, under which "about one-third of the plant managers' pay is based on safety
performance." Hayes, supranote 155, § D, at 1, col. 4. This seemingly satisfies Professor Bower's condition
that individual and corporate self-interest must be aligned before corporate social performances will
improve. The appropriate use of probation can achieve the same result.
157. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 165-71.
158. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
161. E.g., ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & DRUG ABUSE COUNCIL, INC.,
THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 13-30 (1977) (when
the penalty for narcotics possession was increased severely, both the percentage of narcotics arrests that
resulted in indictments and the number of convictions dropped significantly). See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 7.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) ("Experience has shown that sanctions ... are more effective
when they are flexible and moderate; highly afflictive, mandatorypunishment provisions become nullified in
practice') (emphasis added).

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:419

strict penalties have almost uniformly failed. In short, this phenomenon of
nullification implies that severe penalties may actually lower the risk of
conviction more than they raise the sanction upon conviction. Second, eighth
amendment limits are developing to the use of disproportionately severe
offender's
sanctions. 62 Third, there may be an absolute ceiling on the 163
perception of (and, therefore, deterrence by) criminal sanctions.
Finally, and most importantly, there is a key issue concerning the
psychology of offenders. Even though it may be cheaper to raise the severity
of the sanction than the risk of apprehension, it may also be less effective to do
so if the offender responds more to certainty than to severity. Elzinga and
Breit focus on this question at length. 164 Individuals, they recognize, may have
vastly different expected disutilities from the possibility of punishment,
depending on their attitudes toward risk. Essentially, the risk-averse offender
will be more deterred by the severity of the sanction, while the risk-preferring
offender will respond to differentials in the risk of conviction. Thus, as they
see it, only the risk-neutral offender-a rare bird indeed-will be indifferent,
between a 10% probability of ten years and a 100% probability of one year.
Although their demonstration of this point is elegant, their analysis only sets
the stage for the basic empirical question: are corporate officials predominantly risk preferrers or risk averters?
Elzinga and Breit argue that corporate officials are risk averters, responding more to high penalties than to high enforcement.165 They cite economic
historians and theorists who have argued that the modern businessman is far
different and considerably more security conscious than was his predecessor,
the 19th Century Robber Baron. 166 While possibly historically accurate, they
are apparently making the wrong argument. Elzinga and Breit's intertemporal comparison does not compare the businessman with either an
absolute or a relative standard regarding other classes of offenders. At least as
plausible is the contrary assertion that, because the modem businessman deals
respond to
on a daily basis with risk and uncertainty, he is more likely to
167
small changes in risk to which other citizens are insensitive.
In any event, there is a source of empirical insight into this question which
is superior to the rival ipse dixits of the theorists. An inherent characteristic of
organizational crime is that it tends to be committed in groups rather than by
solitary individuals. No one has yet fixed a price without a co-conspirator,
and (as the Equity Funding case shows) the size of the conspiracy can
sometimes vastly exceed that which characterizes other types of criminal
behavior. Recurrently, social scientists have found "that members of a group
will risk more as group members than they will as individuals." 68 Thus, when
162. For a review of the recent case law, see Note, A Closer Look at Habitual Criminal Statutes: Brown
v. Parratt and Martin v. Parratt, A Case Study of Nebraska Law, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 285 nn.70-71
(1979).
163. See Polinsky. supra note 2, at 1675-76 (suggesting that individuals have a "convexity" limit, after
which they fail to respond to additional increments in costs or benefits).
164. K. EI.ZINCGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 120-29; see also Elzinga & Breit, Antitrust Penaltiesand
Attitudes Toward Risk, An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 693, 704-06(1973).
165. K. EtZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 126-28 (citing R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN
THE LARGE CORPORATION 271-351 (1945); J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
121-63 (3d ed. 1950), R. MARRIS, supra note 138, at 1-109; J.K. GAtLBRAITH, supra note 138, at 171-78).
166. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 1, at 126-28.

167. R. BLAIR, supra note 2, at 15-16.
168. Reed, On the Dynamics of Group Decisionmaking in High Places, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter
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businessmen act in concert, their attitude toward risk is likely to shift in the
direction of risk preference. There are various explanations for this finding,
which is referred to as the "risky shift phenomenon."' 169 They range from
male machismo in groups (although mixed male/female groups seem to
perform similarly 170) to the possibility that when responsibility is diffused
within a group no one feels personally responsible for failure. Alternatively,
group members may feel compelled to live up to a shared conception of the
businessman as "tough-minded," a stereotype that may influence each
member of the group to display a willingness to take risks.
In any event, other studies that have not specifically focused on attitudes
toward risk have still produced highly consistent results. Michael Maccoby
has popularized the idea of the corporate executive as the consummate
"gamesman," engaged in an essentially amoral, ladder-climbing endeavor in
which he is extremely sensitive to risks and probabilities.' 7 1 Consistent with
this picture are the findings from a recent experiment run by Wharton School
researchers that involved groups of business school students in a role-playing
game in which, as corporate officials, they were faced with a decision of
whether to remove a dangerous drug produced by their company from the
market. 172 None of the 57 control groups involved were willing to remove the
drug from the market despite the stipulated danger to life. 73 Rather, although
the danger was deliberately made very apparent, 79% of the groups took
active steps to prevent the drug's removal. 74 These and other role playing
experiments seem to corroborate the existence of the risky shift phenonmenon. 175 Thus, if the context of organizational crime encourages a shift in
the direction of risk preference, the certainty of punishment should be a more
important variable than its severity.
1978, at 40, 48. See M. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR (2d
ed. 1976); Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 442

(1968).
169. Reed, supra note 168, at 45, 49.
170. Id. at 48.
171. M. MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN (1976).
172. Armstrong, Social Irreponsibilityin Management, 5 J. Bus. RESEARCH 185 (1977). The case study
used for this role-playing experiment was based on a very similar incident in which the actual drug
manufacturer also refused to remove the drug from the market, resorting instead to litigation and political
pressure in order to resist the FDA. Id. at 196.
173. Id. at 200-01, 205.
174. Id. at 197.
175. Strictly speaking, the decision not to withdraw the dangerous drug may not have been as "risky" as
portrayed, because the penal statutes may not technically have been violated and all potential tort liability
may have been insured. More accurately, this experiment shows the tendency for group conformity,
obedience to authority within the organization, and the ease with which even ad hoc experimental groups
can ignore or repress the external social costs of their decisions. Even these findings, however, equally
support the need for preventive and incapacitative remedies, such as corporate probation and organizational disqualification of convicted officials.
Nor are these role-playing experiments without real world analogues. The Washington Post recently
observed that in one issue it had reported "no fewer than five separate accounts of accidental or planned
mismanagement of chemicals and chemical and radioactive wastes" and, further, "that top company
management approved illegal practices flagrantly violating air-and-water pollution permits." "Dealing
with the Poisoners," Washington Post, Aug. 20, 1979, § A, at 20, col. 1; see "Under Attack: Small
Chemical Firm has Massive Problems with Toxic Products," Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1978, at I (describing a
corporation's repeated releasing of toxic foodstuffs and pesticides known to be dangerous, resulting in
indictment by a federal grand jury).
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In summation, three reasons have been advanced why the conviction rate is
more important than the severity of the penalty: (1) the declining marginal
utility of incarceration, (2) the pattern of nullification surrounding the use of
severe penalties, and (3) the "risky shift phenomenon."
To these, another reason may be added: the world is neither all black nor
all white. There may be substantial numbers of both risk preferrers and risk
averters in th relevant pool of potential offenders. 176 Thus, in asserting that
businessmen are risk averters, Elzinga and Breit appear to fall prey to the
fallacy of over-aggregation. By analogy, it is as if among a sample of school
children, measles was found to be the leading childhood disease with mumps
being a distant second. If, as a result, school children were innoculated only
for the former, the relative frequency of the two diseases would quickly
reverse. One would soon find no measles but much mumps. Similarly, a
strategy which aims exclusively at either the risk averter or the risk preferrer
leaves society vulnerable to the other. In the end, an either/or choice is too
dangerous for the question of risk aversion versus risk preference to be given
more than marginal weight.
V. CONCLUSION

Among the principal points advanced by this article have been the
following:
(1) The threat counts more than the penalty. In order to determine the
deterrent effect of a legal sanction in a world of uncertainty, one must
consider the entire range of outcomes with which the offender was threatened,
not simply the penalty imposed. As a result, simple exchange rate adjustments
between the size of the fine and the length of a prison sentence are not feasible,
because, to increase the deterrent threat of the fine as a criminal sanction, one
must impose not simply a higher fine in an individual case, but rather one
must increase the mean value of the entire probability dispersion for fines.
(2) From this perspective, fines will generally lack the deterrent value of
incarceration because the range of the threatened sanction in the case of
imprisonment typically exceeds that of fines. This difference is not merely a
quirk of existing statutory structures. Rather, a variety of factors prevent us
from structuring an equivalent range into the penalty distribution for fines:
(a) the collectability boundary; (b) the possibility of evasion, downward
modification, or nullification of a severe fine; (c) the constitutional prohibition against increasing the fine once it has been imposed; (d) the tendency of
inflation to erode the significance of a statutory maximum fine; and (e) the
availability of covert techniques for "passing on" the fine to the organization
employing the offender. Only by establishing very high mandatory minimum
levels for fines can these factors be even partially offset.
(3) If substantial reliance is to be placed upon fines as a means of deterring
organizational crime, the predictable result will be higher transaction costs to
176. Indeed, one school of economic opinion, advancing a theory known as the Galbraith-Caves
Hypothesis, believes that in the case of the corporation, the answer depends on the corporation's market
share: the corporation with market power behaves as a risk averter, and utilizes its power to reduce
variance. See. e.g., Christofides & Tapon, Uncertainty, Market Structure, and Performance: The GalbraithCaves Hypothesis Revisited, 93 Q.J. ECON. 719 (1979).
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the judicial system. The offender will have every incentive to evade full
payment and to seek reduction or delay whenever installment payments or a
percentage-of-income formula is employed. Constant monitoring and contested hearings become unavoidable. Although prisons may be even costlier,
these are sunk costs which, given the lim ted number of white-collar offenders,
seem largely discountable in a marginal cost comparison.
(4) The Becker formula for determining the optimal level of the fine, by
ascertaining the expected gain to the offender and the probability of
conviction, is too elusive to implement. Because neither the expected gain to
the individual offender (who, in the organizational context, is typically an
agent to whom only a portion of the crime's benefits flow) nor the frequency
of the overall crime (because the victims of white-collar crimes seldom know
of their injury) can be reliably estimated, the equation has too many
unknowns to be solved.
(5) Criminal justice reforms must take into account the problem of
demoralization costs. A system that fines the rich and jails the poor risks the
appearance of institutionalizing bias, and its asserted efficiency may depend
upon myopic social cost accounting. Thus, to the extent different forms of
criminal sanctions are used, some means of seeking equivalence is necessary.
(6) To the extent that fines are used, both high transaction costs to the
judicial system and high demoralization costs to society can probably best be
avoided by giving the offender a strong incentive to offer a satisfactory fine.
Thus, precise guidelines establishing monetary penalties for a given crime
should not be promulgated because
uncertainty will act to promote equiva17
lence and reduce inequality.
(7) The assertion that the firm rather than the individual should be
punished for corporate crime depends for its validity on questionable
assumptions about (a) the efficiency of the market for corporate control, (b)
the likelihood of an internal disciplinary response within the firm, and (c) the
difficulty of re-entry into the employment market for the fired executive.
None of these assumptions is confirmed by the available empirical evidence.
To the extent that there is a separation between ownership and control within
the modern corporation,17 8 then the case for focusing on the individual
decision-maker is far stronger than the Free Market Economist concedes. To
the extent that corporate managers are seeking to maximize their individual
positions rather than their shareholder's wealth, then the corporation is far
less deterrable than the Free Market Model would lead one to believe.
Conversely, non-pecuniary penalties directed at the firm--such as those
incorporated in a number of recent SEC consent decrees 179-may yield
177. Note, however, that the Department of Justice utilizes precisely this kind of fixed equation in its
sentencing recommendations of 18 months or a $50,000 fine as the base sentence for antitrust felony
offenders. See Antitrust Division Guidelines Memorandum, supra note 42.
178. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932),
arguing that the dilution of control among many geographically dispersed stockholders, and management's
using retained earnings rather than issuing new securities to finance growth, left management virtually
unaccountable to stockholders.

179. See note 155 supra. For other representative examples, see SEC v. Western Geothermal & Power
Corp., [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

96,920 (D. Ariz. 1979) (special officer appointed by court to

supervise company's activities in area of violation); SEC v I1, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,948
(D.D.C. 1979) (appointment of special "Review Person" to oversee work of subcommittee of board
examining improper payments and adequacy of accounting controls).
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deterrent, incapacitative and "rehabilitative" benefits. That is, to the extent
that a possible sanction such as a period of corporate probation threatens the
managerial autonomy of those controlling the firm, its potential availability
may yield a considerable deterrent benefit while very little of its cost is passed
through to stockholders, employees, and consumers.
(8) Even if the neo-classic assumption that a firm will always profit
maximize is accepted, the prospects are not encouraging for achieving
adequate corporate deterrence through reliance on penalties aimed solely at
the firm. Under such a theory the penalty must be increased to a point which,
after discounting it by the likelihood of apprehension, it still exceeds the
expected gain. Corporate crime tends to be uniquely concealable and hence
apprehension rates may often fall well below 10%. If this occurs, the penalty
would have to be tenfold greater than the gain in order to be effective. This
would frequently require the imposition of penalties that raise the prospect of
bankruptcy and thus face nullification by courts unwilling to injure shareholders or employees. Thus, a rational strategy must focus both on the decisionmaker and, in appropriate cases in which corporate behavior has been
repeatedly delinquent, on the need for preventive restraints.
In sum, the case for the conventional wisdom is not weak, even when
articulated in the language of EcoSpeak. Translated into a policy, this view of
the "economic approach" suggests that a short sentence (say three to six
months) should be the benchmark norm for most willful organizational
crimes. Maximum authorized sentences would have to be longer (perhaps five
years), and fines would primarily be used either as a supplementary penalty or
in cases where the offered payment clearly represented an appreciable portion
of the individual's economic wealth.
On a more general level, it must be concluded that a pure theory of the
optimal criminal sanction that is divorced from empirical research is dangerously overextended. This does not necessarily mean that the "economic
approach" has only limited applicability to the context of criminal behavior.
As a filter through which reality in its confusing detail can be examined and
clarified, economic analysis has much to offer. For example, the practical
lawyer's long-standing belief that incarceration carries a greater threat than
fines becomes more comprehensible when we comparatively evaluate both the
actual and possible probability dispersions associated with each. Similarly, the
assertion that certainty of punishment is more important than the severity of
the sanction can be translated and examined as a statement that offenders
tend more to be risk preferrers than risk averters.
But limits on the use of the economic approach need to be clearly
recognized when such an analysis is used outside the context of market
transactions. First, there are value-laden issues surrounding the premises of a
cost-minimization model. Almost certainly, a theory of criminal justice which
gives equal weight to the interests of both offender and victim, and which
places transaction costs on a parity with both will satisfy few. Thus, the
challenging question is what the economic approach can achieve once it either
abandons cost minimization as its criterion or accepts some rules of priority
by which to rank different categories of costs. This article has suggested that,
at least for the present, the economic approach should focus on achieving
equivalence between penalties rather than on quantification of the precise
penalty.
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A second problem with the economic approach is its susceptibility to the
danger of over-aggregation. In market transactions, we can be fairly certain
that an increase in the price will lower the quantity demanded. This model
may have considerable predictive power for criminal sanctions as well (i.e., a
significant increase in the penalty will probably reduce the amount of crime,
other things being equal), but the dangers of the non-conforming, idiosyncratic case are far greater. For example, as earlier discussed, if the relevant
population of potential offenders is composed both of risk averters and risk
preferrers, then raising the sanction without also increasing the apprehension
rate will leave the latter group largely undeterred. The danger to society from
leaving any group of potential offenders systematically undeterred is too great
to rely heavily on a theory which, although it has predictive power, refuses to
acknowledge the likelihood of non-conforming cases.
A third problem with reliance on economic theory as a tool for the
formulation of criminal justice policy is the necessity for incorporating noneconomic factors into the equation before it works. This article has explored
two such factors: (1) the "risky shift" phenomenon under which collective
decisions appear to be made in the face of risks that would have deterred an
individual decision-maker; and, (2) the phenomenon of judicial nullification
under which courts decline to enforce severe penalties.
This tendency for the "real world" to ignore the script and deviate from the
course predicted by the model underscores the dangers of the "Pygmalion
syndrome."' 180 Named after the mythical Greek sculptor who, having carved
the figure of the perfect woman in marble, fell in love with the model and lost
interest in other women, this syndrome should remind us that infatuation
with models can produce a resulting disinterest in more mundane reality.
Models can guide, but they also can blind. Few vested interests are as strong
as a previously published theory.
These criticisms do not deny the worth of economic analysis as a tool for
the formulation of legal rules, but they suggest the need for the intrepid
economist to cease being a solo explorer and take along a guide familiar with
the local terrain (such as, here, a criminologist). More a language than a
science, Ecospeak needs to be supplemented by external premises in order to
work well. In the end, our reply to the Free Market Economist, as academic
imperialist, must be that of Hamlet to Horatio:
There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, Than are
dreamt of in your philosophy.' 5 '
180. See J. SYNGE, TALKING ABOUT RELATIVITY 18 (1970). The relevance of Synge's observation has
been pointed out to me by Professor Ted J. Fiflis, University of Colorado School of Law.
181. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, Scene v.
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APPENDIX
What if a penalty structure for fines could be devised which has a mean
value equal to or greater than that of incarceration? This question was earlier
deferred because it requires some heroic assumptions: either a very low ceiling
must be placed on incarcerative penalties or the collectability boundary must
be penetrated without disproportionate transaction costs. Nonetheless, the
issue is theoretically interesting, particularly because it requires a more
careful focusing on the methodological problem of comparing the disutilities
of different forms of sanctions.
A. THE COMMON MEAN VALUE CASE

Let us assume that the penalty dispersions for fines and incarceration have
the same mean value. This does not mean that the two dispersions are
congruent. An infinite number of symmetrical curves can be drawn around
the same midpoint simply by changing their variance. In theory, the risk
preferrer will prefer the exterior curve (and so will be more deterred by the
interior curve) while, for the risk averter, the reverse is true. Thus, two issues
are framed for analysis: (1)Which dispersion would be interior, and which
exterior? and (2) Do organizational offenders behave more as risk preferrers
or risk averters?
The first issue is more easily approached. A fair premise is that individuals
differ more in their relative levels of wealth than in their relative aversion to
imprisonment. This generalization seems especially true for the organizational criminal. Within this class, wealth levels range from the middle-to the
very-high-income, but all members will share a lack of prior experience with
prison. For criminal populations which include recidivists with prior prison
experience, this generalization may be less accurate. But from this premise, it
follows that the legislature would have to place wider boundaries on its
authorized fine levels than on its authorized prison sentences in order to equip
the court to deal with these greater wealth differences. (This is exactly what
the legislature could not do in a real world setting where the collectability
boundary intervenes.) Put more simply, although a one-to-three year sentencing range might deter both a junior executive and the chairman of the board,
the junior executive might also be deterred by a $20,000 fine while in the
chairman's case only a fine of $1,000,000 would yield equivalent deterrence
(holding the risk of apprehension constant in both cases).
A serious methodological difficulty arises, however, at this point. To say
that the imprisonment curve is interior to the fine curve requires that we be
able to plot both on the same axis. But, although it may seem more likely than
not that a given range of financial penalties was broader than a given
sentencing range, there is no recognized scale or conversion system for
equating confinement and monetary loss-other than, that is, the individual
offender's own subjective preferences. 8 2 But this is itself the answer. The
182. If we assume that individuals are risk averters with respect to wealth and risk preferrers with
respect to confinement, it follows that such offenders would have a "decreasing marginal willingness to buy
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individual offender's own indifference curve can be adopted as the horizontal
axis of a graph. To transform the indifference curve into a cardinalscale (Le.,
one where points are proportionately related to each other),18 3 we would first
ask the offender to specify two different penalties that were to him equal
(hypothetically, six months and a $20,000 fine), and then ask him to specify
two penalties that were twice as severe (possibily, fifteen months and a
$35,000 fine). This point would then be located twice the distance from the
intersection of the X and Y axes as the first point.
DIAGRAM E

Incarceration Dispersion

Fine Dispersion

(6 Months or (15 Months or (25 Months or
$20,000)
S35,000)
S45,000)

PENALTY

Note, however, that the penalties themselves are not proportionally related
(fifteen months is more than twice as great as six months and $35,000 is less
than twice as great as $20,000). This is consistent with our earlier hypothesis
about the relative marginal utilities of these two sanctions. In so "flattening
out" the indifference curve into our horizontal axis, we have converted it from
an ordinal scale of disutility into a cardinal scale.
off successive years of imprisonment." Block & Lind, supra, note 30, at 482. In other words, such an
offender would pay less to buy the fourth year of confinement than the third, and thus his scale of fine
equivalents is not proportional to the length of the sentence. Id. at 483. This lack of proportionality would
be equally true if we make the opposite assumptions and postulate that the offender was a risk preferrer
with respect to wealth losses and a risk averter with respect to confinement. Thus, because the two scales
are not proportional, they cannot be geometrically presented on the same graph except by using the
offender's own subjective trade-offs.
183. An ordinal scale simply provides a relative ranking (e.g., warm, hot, hotter, hottest). A cardinal
scale calibrates the degree of difference (e.g., 300, 40 , 50'). Knowing that one indifference curve is interior
to another supplies us only with an ordinal ranking.
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This, in turn, has a profound effect on earlier arguments made about the
marginal disutility of different forms of punishment. Now, the mean of each
dispersion is in fact the midpoint of the offender's own subjective preferences,
his personal halfway mark. He would no longer assign a lesser negative value
to a sentence above the mean than he would to a sentence below the mean.
Thus, the earlier assertion that he would be a risk preferrer no longer
necessarily applies because the expected disutilities on both sides of the mean
balance exactly. In other words, where the horizontal axis is expressed in
either years or dollars, it is possible to assert that doubling the penalty does
not necessarily double the pain (the disutility could less than double in the
case of incarceration and it could more than double in the case of fines).
Either way, the scale does not ascend proportionately. In contrast, a scale
such as shown by Diagram E is by definition proportional. We can, however,
still posit that the fine curve would have greater variance than the imprisonment curve and would thus be the exterior curve. This follows because
authorized fines must be large enough to deter even the most wealthy
offender. Does this mean the offender would now be a risk averter and choose
the interior imprisonment curve? Not at all. Such a conclusion must rely on
arguments about marginal utility which have here been factored out.
Is the offender therefore risk neutral? Not necessarily. Several arguments
for a risk preference psychology still remain that are independent of any
marginal utility foundation. First, there is the earlier argument that, because
sentences are not random, the offender can help himself and beat the odds by
investing in legal talent. A second variation on this theme involves the ability
of the offender to seek post-sentencing reductions in a fine by pleading an
adverse change in financial circumstances. A third variation is the possibility
for the offender to conceal earnings and other accessions to wealth. Finally,
the "risky shift" phenomenon also applies, because it is premised on the
psychology of the group, rather than arguments about marginal disutilities.
As a result, all remaining factors suggest that the offender should gamble in
this context. Because his fine can be lowered but not raised,1 84 it is a case of
heads, he wins; tails, he breaks even. Unless he commits perjury or is found in
contempt of court, however, he never loses by seeking to reduce the fine or
understate his wealth. Moreover, the high transaction cost to the state of
prosecuting an offender who seeks to understate his wealth makes the threat
of a perjury indictment or a contempt citation relatively weak.
In summarizing this argument, Professor Posner states that it represents a
retraction of this article's earlier assertion that rational offenders would be
risk averters with respect to fines.' 8 5 Why he should think so is puzzling. The
general conclusion that offenders would be risk averse in comparing different
financial penalties was based on the premise that money has a declining
marginal utility-a premise no longer applicable once different forms of
penalties are plotted on a scale which shows the offender's own subjective
trade-offs. The basic conclusion that incarcerative penalties produce more
184. Double jeopardy prohibits a court from raising a defendant's fine after he has been sentenced.
United States v. Best, 571 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126, 128-29 (1st
Cir. 1977). To be sure, willful concealment of assets could be found to constitute a violation of a condition
of probation and to justify probation revocation and confinement, but Bynoe expressly prohibits the postsentence increase of a fine.
185. Posner, supra note 12, at 414.
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deterrence was founded instead on the greater mean value associated with
incarcerative penalties, not on an argument involving any assumption about
the offender's attitude toward risk. In addition, the analysis in this section
assumes there is no collectability boundary. Different premises produce
different conclusions, but not a retraction by any means.
B. CAN THE FINE DISPERSION HAVE A HIGHER MEAN VALUE?

To this point, we have considered both the "real world" case where the
mean value of the threat of imprisonment exceeds that of a fine and the
theoretical case where these mean values are equal. But, before leaving this
Never-Never-land, what would happen if we sought to stretch the fine
dispersion outward so that its mean value exceeded that of the imprisonment
dispersion? In reality, this ignores the concept of a collectability boundary, but
even apart from this "real world" obstacle, there is a greater objection to the
feasibility of such a penalty structure. Put simply, the offender might accept
imprisonment rather than pay the fine. As others have recognized, there is a
need for the authorized period of incarceration to be more severe than the
maximum authorized fine in order for the former sanction to be available to
enforce the latter. 186 Although a special penalty could be created for a
contumacious refusal to pay, the offender who is ably counselled should be
able to evade this by seeming properly deferential. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, confinement for nonpayment cannot exceed six months and service of
such confinement may extinguish the obligation to pay the fine. 187 Thus, even
in the theoretical case, greater variance and (probably) a higher mean value
should characterize the incarceration dispersion.
In rebuttal, Professor Posner points out that this argument (that, to be
effective, fines must be backstopped by higher incarcerative penalties) was
first made by Block and Lind, who nonetheless believe that fines are a more
efficient penalty than incarceration. 188 I do not doubt that this is a correct
statement of their position, but its relevance is uncertain. All that I assert is
that it would be unworkable to create a penalty structure in which the
offender would prefer to be imprisoned than fined. Thus, if one accepts that
the schedule of incarcerative penalties must have a higher maximum than that
for fines, it tends to follow (other things being equal) that the incarcerative
threat will generate more deterrence. Admittedly, those subscribing to a costminimization model may consider this incremental threat to be superfluous,
useful only to the extent it coerces payment. But, from this article's
perspective, such cost-minimization logic is too narrow, both because of the
impossibility of quantification and because it ignores the demoralization costs
that result if one form of sanction is systematically more lenient and yet
available only to a socially favored class. Moreover, if one posits that most
186. See Block & Lind, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered. supra note 2, at 244-45. These writers
argue that for a system of fines to be cheaper than a system of confinement, "the alternative prison term
must be set so that its fine equivalent is greater than the fine for a given crime. Otherwise an individual will
choose prison rather than pay the fine and there will be no savings." Id. at 245.
187. See Commentary to ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 13, at Standard 18-7.4. Since their
original adoption in 1968, the ABA Sentencing Standards have recommended that -[s]ervice of such a term
should discharge the obligation to pay the fine."
188. Posner, supra note 12, at 414.
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forms of organizational crime are capable of concealment, then under the
Becker model, severe sanctions are necessary. From this perspective, it would
seem strange indeed to characterize the additional threat implicit in the
higher maximum for incarcerative penalties as superfluous. Even within the
tight little world of microeconomics, it should be recognizable that the higher
range of incarcerative penalties provides society with a "cheap" form of
deterrence because it enables us to bark more than we bite.
C. IMPLICATIONS AND AMBIGUITIES

A movement toward determinate sentencing is currently sweeping state
legislatures. In one of the more interesting statutory expressions of this trend,
California has dramatically compressed the sentencing ranges for all
crimes. 189 In effect, it has limited the sentencing judge's discretion so that the
sentence imposed may deviate only slightly from the actual median time
historically served by California offenders for similar crimes. Thus, where
once an offender might have been sentenced to a term of from one year to life
for a given crime, the same offender today will be sentenced (if the historical
median were actually six years) to a term of either five, six or seven years. In
terms of this article's perspective, this is a policy of reducing the variance
around a common midpoint. That is, the legislature has simply drawn a
narrower penalty dispersion around the same mean.
Such a policy makes sense if one believes that offenders are risk preferrers
with respect to imprisonment. Does the California experience therefore offer
the possibility of an empirical test of this thesis? Unfortunately, I doubt it. A
host of methodological complexities must be faced before the data from any
such legislative policy experiment could be so interpreted. There may even be
a substitution effect by which the gain in deterrence with respect to risk
preferrers was offset by a loss in deterrence vis-a-vis risk averters. Nonetheless, there appear to be a variety of contexts-plea bargaining, determinate
sentencing statutes, the retention of parole, the nolo contendere plea-which
are susceptible to a "mean/variance" analysis. 190
189. See Cassu & Taugher, DeterminateSentencing in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J.
5, 22-31 (1978); Messinger & Johnson, California's Determinate Sentence Statute: History and Issues, in
NAT'L INST. OF L. ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUST., DETERMINATE
REGRESSION? (1978).
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190. Manaski, Prospectsfor Inference on Deterrence through Empirical Analysis of Individual Criminal
Behavior, in PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, supra note !1, at 400,
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